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Abstract 
 This thesis started with one question: “how could we make the legal system 
more fair for more people?” One possible answer is given to that question in the four 
chapters that follow: we can achieve a more fair and efficient legal system by 
providing our citizens with a basic level of legal literacy. That basic education 
includes a general knowledge of the structure and foundation of law, its content and 
purpose and finally the role of the people within political systems supporting 
different kinds of legal theories. I have argued that such education will increase 
people’s interest about legal matters while encouraging them to take a more active 
role with regards to legal matters. Often emphasized in this thesis is the role of 
interpretation within law. I’ve argued that the central role of interpretation in law 
could serve as an advantage for the citizens given that they sport the belief that they 
could bring out positive changes within their society and provided that they become 
motivated to take action based on that belief.  
The first step in achieving such changes is increasing legal literacy, an 
intricate part of which would be to show ordinary citizens the many subtlties that 
exist at different levels of law. People’s awareness of such subtleties accompanied 
with further institutional changes which would allow them to seek legal advice at an 
affordable rate and in different ways – as suggested in chapter four of this thesis - 
should help prevent many legal troubles from arising in the first place, thereby 
leading to a more fair and efficient legal state: one in which less injustice is seen and 
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Preface 
 Sometimes events in life touch us in a way that we cannot ignore. These 
events make us think, make us feel and make us react. I had one such experience, 
amongst others, that I believe is worth talking about.  
 The following pages are a series of philosophical reflections that have 
resulted from that experience. These thoughts concern the ethics of law. There is an 
important distinction to be made between ethics and morality in this context: 
whereas different kinds of morality form subsets of ethics; ethics – as I talk about it - 
is concerned with more general and universal principles and their embodiment in 
our legal system. I do not allude to any particular kind of morality in this thesis, as I 
believe that requires a separate and exclusive set of considerations; instead, I focus 
on values such as justice and fairness as criteria for evaluating law. The guiding 
question of this thesis is: “how can we make law more fair and beneficial for more 
people?” While legal theories have provided helpful insights into how laws are and 
should be made and applied, they have left out one significant factor that plays an 
important part in the ethics of law: the role of ordinary people and their knowledge 
and awareness of the law.  
 This thesis is an attempt to show the ways in which this kind of knowledge is 
important in making the law not only more fair but also more efficient. If correct, it 
implies a need to make some changes in the way people are educated about the law 
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Chapter One 
Living the Domino Effect 
 The domino effect starts with the fall of a first domino and it goes on to knock 
over as many dominoes as are placed within the chain of dominos. What is the best 
way to avoid the effect? Prevent the first domino from falling. Here is my story of 
how I found myself within a huge domino effect and how it affected my vision and 
goals.  
1.1 The blow that set it all off  
I was twenty years old, fresh out of college and starting my first year of 
studies at McGill University. I remember many things from that year and I 
remember them vividly. I remember my ambitious spirit: the kind that makes you 
feel like you’re unstoppable. I remember the good feeling of freedom that I got from 
walking the streets of downtown Montreal as a young adult, ready to discover the 
path to the rest of my life. I was determined, happy, and open to the world. It was 
some time before I experienced things that would change my perspective on life. 
 The experience that I’m talking about started very subtly: yes, like many 
significant events in our life, it almost didn’t happen at all. One day, at the end of one 
of my introductory courses in psychology, a couple of students walked in and made 
an announcement regarding a “Summer Management Program” for students. They 
presented it as a great experience, a C.V. builder that would earn the participants 
between $9000-$16000 for the summer while putting the participants ahead of 
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their peers. Those who were interested were asked to sign up for an information 
session to learn more about the program. I stood there looking at the front of the 
auditorium where the people had made the announcement. I couldn’t really see 
their faces from afar. It took a few seconds until I decided that it sounded like a good 
opportunity and that it couldn’t hurt to sign up to hear more about this program. So 
I did.  
 I received a call a few days later. Some lady named Sophie informed me of the 
time and the place where the information session was taking place. When I showed 
up at the information session, the room was full of young university students, most 
of whom were in their first year of studies. When the person in charge of the session 
started speaking, she had full control. She told us of the top quality of their company, 
its long-standing history - of nearly thirty years - and its selective nature when it 
came to hiring, which wouldn’t mean much to us if it weren’t accompanied by a 
chance to be hired by this great company. Her description of the majority of 
students going through their undergraduate studies without any outstanding extra-
curricular experiences resonated as true to most of us. She told us that, without 
having ‘real-world’ experience upon graduating, we would be in a position of 
disadvantage compared to people who did have that kind of experience. She 
marketed the program as something which would be useful to people of every field 
and she told us that we would gain some invaluable experience by taking part in the 
program that this company was offering to us.  
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In terms of the details of the program, we were told that we would be 
running our own business: an enticing proposal for the group of young students 
who were gathered in the room. The company would train us and help us succeed. 
But before that, they had to make sure of our interest. On a scale of one to ten - one 
being least interested and ten being fully interested – we had to vote twelve in terms 
of how badly we wanted to be a part of this great, life-changing experience. We were 
then asked to sign up again if we wished to enter the hiring process.  
 Four years later, the term ‘life-changing’ has acquired a whole new meaning 
for me. As I learned, this term does not always bear a positive connotation, at least 
not until after one has made something worthwhile out of it. My experience with 
this program did change my life but it did so in a very costly, bitter manner. My first 
mistake – strike one - was that I, like many other students, trusted the people who 
were offering this program to us. That trust ended up hurting us because it was not 
based on right or sufficient knowledge of the presenters, the program, our rights, or 
how bad a program (which had been authorized by the university to come and 
recruit on campus) could turn out to be. While I have taken responsibility for the 
part of the damages that resulted from my youthful perseverance and stubbornness, 
a substantial part of what went wrong was – I maintain - due to lack of knowledge 
and awareness on many different levels; and this lack was beyond me or my fault; it 
is something that needs closer study, since it can be generalized to many other 
similar situations.  
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 What followed the day of the information session was a series of phone calls 
and in-person interviews. At each step of this long-winded hiring process we were 
told a little more about the excellent experience awaiting us, while being reminded 
that: “we had to earn our right to work with this company.” The plan was for each 
hired student to run a painting business offering services to residential houses. We 
were told that all necessary training would be provided. We were not to worry if we 
didn’t know how to paint because they would show us. In addition, we weren’t going 
to be the ones painting in any case: we would hire and train other students to do 
that. We would be managers learning communication, leadership, and other 
valuable skills. By the time the last interview rolled around, I was really eager to 
take part in the program.  
That day came on a cold December night; it was around 7:00 pm when I sat 
down in an empty café in one of McGill’s buildings with the vice president of the 
company and another student who was also being hired. The vice-president put a 
contract in front of us that was about twelve pages in length, single-spaced, and in 
rather small print. He went over the contract with us: nothing he mentioned 
sounded alarming at all. He was going over the contract in his own words. At the 
end, he smiled, gave us a pen, and asked if we were ready to start. We both signed 
the contract.  
 That contract was to become the bane of my existence for the next nine – 
seemingly longer - months, not to mention the struggles I had to overcome because 
of it during the legal proceedings that followed, which came to last about four years. 
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Signing the contract was my second mistake – strike two. As I found out a few 
months into the program, the contract left all important responsibilities on my 
shoulders while it gave the company the right to take heavy royalty payments from 
me. This could have worked fine if I were provided with the right kind of training, 
which had been previously promised. 
 For the first time in my life, I started asking and learning about what a 
contract is and what it entails. Most people’s understanding of a contract 
corresponds largely to the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of it: “a mutual 
agreement between two or more parties that something shall be done or forborne 
by one or both; a compact, covenant, bargain, especially such as has legal effects; a 
convention between states.”1 This was my understanding too: a contract is 
something that creates obligations and responsibilities between two or more 
parties; it also protects one’s rights in case one party fails to fulfill its duties as have 
been set out by the contract; it is basically a promissory tool used by people to 
ensure the advancement of their goals and the protection of their rights.  
 The more basic question of the legitimacy of any given contract seems to 
cause people more hesitation and uncertainty. And it is definitely a point that is 
often overlooked or left unconsidered. By legitimacy, I am referring to the 
lawfulness of any given contract. Presumably, anyone with rather minimal writing 
skills could draft what may be called a ‘contract’. And in that sense, there is a direct 
relation between the legitimacy of a contract and its binding power. Consider the 
                                                        
1 “Contract,” Oxford English Dictionary, accessed March 10th, 2012, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/40328?rskey=0HWtGG&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid.   
 
  6 
following: if someone somehow tricks me into signing a ‘contract’ that requires me 
to commit murder, I am not actually liable or held legally accountable for not killing 
the mentioned person. In that sense, some illegitimate contracts are considered null. 
However, as I found out, when it comes to the question of legitimacy of most 
contracts, there is an overwhelming gray zone, and that fact didn’t quite set in until I 
actually heard the lawyers with whom I consulted say that they could not tell what 
exactly would follow a breach of the particular contract that I had signed with that 
company. As I will explain, the uncertainty and ambiguity of such cases serve as a 
reason why we must educate people on legal matters: since education brings people 
a healthy sense of skepticism and encourages them to seek more information once 
they can recognize that more information is needed before entering into certain 
agreements. One way to make sure that recognition takes place is through legal 
education that aims to increase legal awareness amongst people.  
 John Rawls’ conception of justice and the requirements of ‘the original 
position’ provide us with more reasons why we should strive to become aware 
citizens who actively seek information in legal situations.2 John Rawls define justice 
as fairness by laying down the requirements of what he calls the ‘original position’. 
The original position is part of a hypothetical thought experiment which aims to 
envision how justice as fairness could be implemented at the outset of any social 
binding, presumably in the state of nature prior to the formation of societies. Rawls 
explains that to conceive fair principles that will bind people together, those 
                                                        
2 Special thanks to Dr. Mathieu Doucet for pointing out the relevance of Rawls’ theory of justice in 
this context and for suggesting the inclusion of a discussion of the latter in this section.  
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principles need to be decided from behind what he calles ‘the veil of ignorance.’ In 
that state, people deciding on the principles are completely ignorant of what their 
position is society would be once the principles are decided. They would also be 
ignorant of all other social and personal characteristics that they would be assigned, 
i.e. their level of intelligence, their rank or opportunities. The idea is that deciding 
principles from behind the veil of ignorance encourages the conception of fair 
principles from which everyone could benefit, no matter their rank, power or 
abilities. Clearly, this picture – as idealistic and rational as it is – is not achieved in 
reality: contracts are drafted by people who are very well aware of their situation, 
rank and resources. Nevertheless, Rawls’ theory highlights why it is so important for 
us to be mindful of the fact that the original position – which could potentially create 
more fair legal situations – is not fulfilled in reality: seeing that contracts and other 
similar principles are decided by people who are aware of their situation and who 
bear individualistic interest, it is up to the citizens to point out and try to correct 
unfair situations when they do arise. And that alone constitutes a valid reason for 
seeking more information and education on what is involved in each legal situation.  
 However, there is another reason found in Rawls’ theory that pushes us to 
actively seek a legal education: that is, even if the conditions for deciding principles 
from behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ were fulfilled; that would still be insufficient for 
achieving justice. That’s because, as Rawls explains: 
 “…a society is well-ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good 
of its members but when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of 
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justice. That is, it is a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that the 
others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic social institutions 
generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles.”3    
 What we must recognize is that the satisfaction of the two points mentioned 
in the above quote requires that people keep social institutions in check and that 
translates into assuming an active role within the legal system. More shall be said 
about some basic ways in which citizens could help in keeping social institutions in 
check. For now, it is important to stress the relevance of having a basic of legal 
literacy as a first step towards becoming involved in such matters.  
 December passed with all its usual festivities. Friends and family were 
congratulating me for having successfully passed through the hiring process and for 
taking on the big challenge of running my own business for the summer. There were 
no spoken suspicions about the nature of the program I was getting involved with. It 
was towards the end of December that I received an e-mail outlining the upcoming 
training sessions in January. We would learn about estimating, marketing, and 
painting technology in a jam-packed three-day weekend at a hotel in Montreal, over 
coffee and sweets. Day one of the training mostly consisted of self-promotion by the 
company. We were asked to dress formally: little did we know that it was all part of 
the game being played on us. The setting and the environment were undoubtedly 
organized in a savvy effort to make us feel that we were involved in something really 
big: it definitely felt like a formal and exciting session as we sat around tables 
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listening to the president of the company telling his story of success, working as a 
young manager with this company years ago. He told us of the great things his 
company did for him as a young student, and all that he’d been able to achieve as a 
result of running this company. Day two was all about marketing skills: we were 
told how to talk to potential customers, how to find customers and, most 
importantly, how to gain home owners’ trust so that they would agree to leave their 
painting projects to us. We were also given a big binder of paper outlining paint 
technology. Someone told us some very basic facts about paint technology for all of 
two hours: we learned that latex paint was used for indoor jobs and oil paint was 
used for outdoor projects. The same person told us how important it is to prepare 
any surface before painting it, but he forgot to tell us all the ways in which that 
preparation should, or could, be done. Finally, during day three of this training, we 
learned how to estimate jobs… from a couple of pictures. We each did two “painting 
exercises” based on those pictures. At the end of the day, we were broken up into 
groups. Each group was assigned a district manager (someone who had gone 
through the program in previous years), who was to be the mentor and general 
supervisor whose job it was to ensure the success of our businesses.  
 Anyone who’s ever picked up a brush may legitimately ask: “how could 
someone learn how to paint from a book; or from pictures and in just a few hours?” 
Knowing how to paint properly takes practice and some significant amount of 
experience. The painter who I contacted as a part of my preparations for court told 
me that, to become a licensed painter in Quebec, one needs 6000 hours of 
experience in addition to substantial theoretical testing and learning. My manager 
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took five hours to teach us how to paint: five minutes of that was showing us how to 
hold a brush and the rest of the four hours and fifty five minutes consisted of him 
watching us paint one solitary indoor room. The unfinished job did not look 
promising at the end of the day. But this was at the beginning of May. By that time, I 
and the other managers in the same position, had spent many cold winter nights 
going door to door, looking for leads to book painting jobs. We had gone into 
strangers’ houses on weekends, or after school, to make estimates for painting 
contracts. We had convinced people to sign painting contracts that bound us, the 
students, to the clients. We had taken on the responsibility of finishing those 
contracts in a satisfactory manner. Until that day in early May, we had not actually 
tried to paint.  I remember feeling tired and worried at the end of the painting 
session, as I thought of the $25,000 worth of painting jobs that I had booked. I was 
terrified to find out that we weren’t going to have any more sessions to learn how to 
paint.  
1.2 The fall of the dominos 
 In the months that followed, I had to hire other students who would execute 
the painting jobs for me. I had to supervise their work, deal with a lot of angry 
customers, and drive around town to get paint and supplies to my crews to make 
sure they could work. Summer days were long and I felt quite alone in dealing with 
everything that came up (despite the support of my family, who were worried about 
my health due to all the stress and lack of sleep). The company that hired me was 
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earning money, while I was only losing money, owing to the royalty part of the 
contract previously described and the different expenses that I had to shoulder.   
 My manger had no useful solutions for me and was only pushing me to get 
more painting contracts, for obvious reasons. My painters became increasingly 
unhappy, as I couldn’t pay them properly: because the company was controlling all 
the money, and wasn’t advancing enough money to me to pay my painters. The 
whole thing turned into a nightmare, as customers joined in on the “let’s-take-
advantage-of- students-front”, and refused to pay for completed jobs on the last day 
that we finished their job. They suddenly realized that they were not happy with the 
work we had done.  
 Why didn’t I quit? The contract I had signed mentioned that I would have to 
pay a fee of $4000 if I decided to quit. In addition, my clients - to whom I had made a 
legal promise - could pursue legal action against me if I didn’t complete their work. 
The company, on the other hand, was also threatening to pursue me in court if I quit 
and didn’t pay the penalty for quitting. I had unfinished work plus one job which 
had gone disastrously wrong: my painters had done a bad job of staining one client’s 
deck which had turned fuscia when it was supposed to be light brown. The client 
was quite angry, and made repeated threats to make me pay for the damage that 
was caused if I didn’t fix it. While my father was advising me to quit and just let go, 
the threats of the clients and the company were weighing very heavy on my 
shoulders. I missed my sister’s graduation day because I had to work.   
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 Strike three was not having any idea about how the legal system worked.4 In 
other word, I felt utterly illiterate when it came to legal matters. I was not even 
certain about my rights in this case, even though I had a strong feeling that I had 
been wronged. In hindsight, I had some bizarre ideas about what being sued 
entailed, but it was little consolation that older people around me could not say with 
any certainty which way the case would go if the company or the clients did end up 
taking me to court. In addition, I wondered - as a law-abiding, tax paying young 
adult - what being sued would do to my future and my name. The company had 
done an excellent job of scaring all present and past students: no one wanted to give 
any advice or say anything that could get them in trouble. As for me, all the stress 
had completely changed my way of thinking, to the point where I didn’t feel like 
myself anymore. I couldn’t wait for the whole thing to be over. It was some time 
around February 2008 - a few months after my contract with the company had 
ended - that I filed a claim at the small claims court against the company for all the 
damages they had caused me. I tried to convince other students to join in with me 
but no one thought it would be worth the trouble. I wondered where their principles 
laid and whether they were really convinced that it was a hopeless case and, if so, 
what led them to think that way.  
 A quick reflection reveals that my story can be generalized to many different 
instances, and I believe that alone makes my case an important one to consider 
carefully: that consideration should include my perspective and reactions – as the 
                                                        
4 Strike one was blindly trusting the company and its representatives while strike two was the action 
that followed as a result of that trust, i.e. signing the contract without any further inquiries. 
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person who was directly involved with this case- as well as those of my peers and 
people who were involved with this situation in more indirect, yet important, ways. 
The reaction of others is important not only because it affected my mindset – much 
like it would have affected the mindset of anyone else in my position - but also 
because their collaboration would have made a big difference in how the lawsuit 
turned out to be. Consider this: the kind of approach to law exhibited by my peers is 
not at all uncommon, although the nature and severity of consequences for people 
may vary from case to case. Bosses, companies, and individuals are constantly 
“forced” to comply with what they may consider to be unjust circumstances or 
conditions simply because, like my peers, they believe that there is no other or 
better choice. Many of us do feel that we are helpless with regards to the terms and 
conditions of giant monopolies, cell phone companies, property laws, powerful 
people, etc. It’s not just that most of us don’t take active measures to counter what 
we consider to be unjust (albeit legal) conditions; we can actually knowingly place 
ourselves within their grasp. We become obligated to obey and follow terms that 
were not directly drafted by us. Of course, we do this because we believe that the 
materials, status, or positions that are offered to us in return add some kind of value 
to our life: we buy gas because it allows us to travel longer distances to go and visit 
or help loved ones; we sign cell-phone contracts because cell-phones allow us to run 
businesses and stay in closer reach of the people in our life. However, the value-
added is independent of our attitude towards the legal contracts which we enter 
into for these exchanges to happen.  
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 Many workers do not have the luxury of negotiating the terms of their 
contract, and many have to take on jobs simply because it will pay the bills for them 
and help support their families. But presumably nobody rejoices in the thought that 
they are paying more than they should, or being treated badly, in exchange for 
something they need or want. In short, whether forced into the situation or not, 
we’re all guilty of this approach: at one point or another we find ourselves in the 
situation of having to comply with something that we have explicitly agreed to, but 
with which we are not at ease. This happens even when the dangers of the situation 
and the legal repercussions are well publicized: the credit card companies and the 
burden they put on individuals who misuse credit is a case in point. Of course, the 
cost of many of these contracts is affordable to us and, for the sake of convenience, 
we often just live with them; however, problematic cases such as mine do arise and 
that is when the attitude of helplessness could no longer be ignored: we must ask 
ourselves: “Are we truly helpless or are we merely intimidated by the apparent 
magnitude of the situation within which we find ourselves?” In other words, when 
the costs of these exchanges greatly outweigh their benefits and we are directly and 
severely harmed by these costs, we are pushed to think about the situation in more 
depth. But even then, thinking about our troubles is not enough to help us unless it 
comes with an action-motivating belief that something can be done to improve our 
situation. I argue that legal education will form the basis of that kind of belief: the 
belief that we are not helpless and that something could be done to change many of 
these situations for the better, especially in solidarity. Moreover, legal education 
would help stop problematic cases from arising in the first place, as people become 
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more aware of their rights, how the legal system works and what is at stake. To 
achieve that kind of awareness, it’s important to reflect on experiences like mine 
and point out what we can change to avoid such cases altogether. I grant that aiming 
to completely eradicate such cases is unrealistic and therefore a bad goal to set for 
ourselves. However, I do believe that there is a way to considerably reduce the 
occurrence of such cases, and that is enough to make this proposal one that is 
worthy of serious consideration.  
1.3 Preventing the fall of the dominos 
 When harmful cases such as the one I found myself in do arise, the first 
question is: who’s to blame? And why do these cases happen? Are individuals who 
agree to such contracts or conditions the only culpable parties in these cases? I’m 
inclined to say no. To claim that “you, or they, should have known better and should 
not have gotten involved with the given company or law in the first place” is: 1) a 
false choice in many cases; and 2) treating the issue at a very superficial level. While 
ordinary citizens do bear part of the responsibility with regards to what happens to 
them – and I have owned up to my own part in my situation - the roots of the 
problem lay elsewhere. I will argue that often such cases come up because of 
ordinary people’s lack of legal literacy and their misunderstanding of the law, their 
rights and how those are applied in different situations. I will also show, in the 
following chapters, how that kind of ignorance leads to other negative consequences 
for the people. Thus, legal illiteracy sets in motion an often disastrous, even when 
subtle, domino effect in legal situations that affect people’s lives in various ways and 
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to different degrees. A radical and lasting solution for the prevention of that effect is 
to plant the first domino on strong grounds, meaning that we must equip people 
with the right kind of legal knowledge and understanding to keep them strong on 
their grounds, thus preventing them from falling and thereby causing unnecessary 
damage for themselves and others. That would, in turn, make our system more 
efficient (i.e. one that produces the most good with the least amount of waste) by 
making it more difficult for corporations or other entities to manipulate and take 
advantage of people’s legal naivety, which would lead to a reduction in the number 
of litigations thereby freeing funds and resources for more difficult and complicated 
cases that are less preventable.   
 I am considering this issue in the context of North America, with its 
democratic political system, and the fairly peaceful life-style which it offers its 
inhabitants. And, in this context, if private individuals do not bear the full 
responsibility of the troubles which ensue from a legal situation, something or 
someone else is also at fault. Likely candidates are legislators, judges, corporations 
or the foundation and functioning of the legal system itself. Another possibility, the 
more likely one in this context, is that the legal system and our law enforcers are for 
the most part good and blameless but it’s the way in which we, as a society, use and 
understand the laws and our legal resources which is faulty, and that is what allows 
entities such as corporations to take advantage of ordinary citizens and get away 
with it. In other words, it is possible that we, the citizens of a legal state, are just not 
using the legal system in the right way. I submit that the reason for this misuse is 
ordinary people’s general lack of understanding of law. By that, I’m referring to their 
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ignorance of the laws, the nature of our legal system, its foundation and purpose. 
The law seems to work against the innocent in some cases simply because not 
enough people are aware what law could do for them or, in the case that they are 
aware of its potential, they can’t use that power - because using that power requires 
the collaboration of a group of people. As mentioned before, I believe that an 
increase in legal understanding amongst ordinary people is highly likely to reduce 
the number of civil cases by preventing some legal problems from arising in the first 
place and by uniting people in their belief – and action – that something can and 
must be done to fight legal injustice in cases where it does occur. As a consequence, 
fewer resources would have to be spent on resolving cases which would have been 
prevented, had the public had a better knowledge of what each situation presented 
for them. In that sense, our legal system would be more efficient by focusing 
resources on solving cases that are more difficult to foresee and prevent than those 
resulting from a lack of basic legal knowledge. 
 It is important to note here that ignorance of law and lack of solidarity in 
response to unjust and unlawful events are two closely related issues that are not to 
be conflated, but to be seen in relation to one another.5 Figuratively speaking, they 
are two dominos standing next to one another. Ignorance of the law often creates 
feelings and beliefs of helplessness amongst people, which then leads to lack of 
solidarity and shying away from action in the face of injustice on the part of the 
people. This is a significant point, especially considering that many individuals stray 
                                                        
5 Many thanks to Dr. Shannon Dea for stressing the importance of pointing out and discussing this 
distinction. 
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away from involvement in legal cases due to the costs that are required by legal 
procedures: yet, in solidarity the costs are often reduced because they are split 
amongst many individuals – instead of one person having to bear all the costs 
(including spending time, money and other resources).  
1.4 A new approach to legal understanding: The Method 
 I’m happy to say that, a few months ago, my court case was decided in my 
favour. I learnt quite a lot from the whole process, mostly because I was made to 
think and learn about issues and questions that I would perhaps not have 
considered in a substantial way were it not because I found myself in trouble. 
Amongst the questions that I had to tackle were the following: what is the place and 
role of written law in society? What is the place of justice, or other universally 
valued principles, within law or in conflicts like the one I found myself in? What 
about rights of the citizens? How are they protected? What are the ways, besides 
legislation, to change bad laws? I found good answers to those questions by seeking 
a basic understanding of our legal system, its foundation, and its purpose. To 
demonstrate and contribute to that understanding is the goal of this thesis, as it is 
what helped me become a more aware citizen, and also because it is the kind of 
knowledge that I believe is crucial for anyone else who wishes to protect themselves 
from the sometimes harmful effects of what may be legal, yet unjust conditions. 
Therefore, I propose a consideration of these questions as the method to be used in 
laying down a basic knowledge of law for our citizens, from a young age. 
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 One may wonder about the reasons behind my emphasis on starting legal 
education at a young age. I would argue that legal education, like any other form of 
social education, helps develop a certain culture amongst our youth: a culture that 
encourages them to be critical and observant thinkers in legal matters. It is my 
conviction that if we wish to raise citizens who are sensitive to such issues, we need 
to start that education from an early age: for instance in high school, as teenage 
years are often the time when our sensitivities and major interests are formed. 
Some suggestions about how we could incorporate such education within our 
secondary curriculum will be presented in chapter four.   
1.5 A new approach to legal understanding: The Positive Agenda 
 This proposal is also based on and motivated by an observation I made 
during my research in preparation for court: I realized that, traditionally, the 
answers to the questions that I had to tackle has come from different perspectives 
that mainly focus on the lawmakers and law-enforcement entities. I noticed that the 
role that ordinary people play in the legal success of a given state hasn’t really gotten 
much attention. Undoubtedly, legislation is focused on a descriptive and normative 
account of the people, their psychology, actions and reactions; but, by and large, a 
passive role is attributed to the common people in legal theories. This is true of 
major legal theories, such as: natural law theory; positivism; and the interpretivist 
school of thought, as we shall see in the following chapter. The role of the people has 
not exceeded that of “subjects of the law” who are obligated to obey the law for their 
own good and for the good of the others; this is despite different and independent 
kinds of studies and research that have shown the influence of people’s beliefs on 
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their support of or disagreement with different laws – such as those regarding the 
ownership of guns in America. In a study, Kahan et al. showed people’s cultural 
beliefs to be one of the most significant factors in determining people’s support of or 
opposition to ownership of guns. Moreover, they found people dismissed or 
accepted empirical evidence on “gun control risks” based on whether or not the 
evidence cohered with their cultural beliefs. Kahan et al thus concluded that:  
“Rather than focus on quantifying the impact of gun control laws on 
crime…academics and others who want to contribute to resolving the gun debate 
should dedicate themselves to constructing a new expressive idiom that will allow 
citizens to debate the cultural issues that divide them in an open and constructive 
way.”6  
  
 Such studies highlight the subtle yet influential effect that people’s cultural 
beliefs have on their interactions with the law or issues that are subject of the law. 
Thus, it is important to nurture and pay heed to the formation of such culture – 
namely through education. In the present context, that education cannot be 
complete without the attribution of a more active role to the general population as 
members of a society where law rules. Emphasizing and defending the attribution of 
a more active role to our citizens is the positive agenda of this thesis. But first, we 
must consider what is meant by ‘attribution of an active role’ to the general 
population. 
 In the present context, active citizens are individuals who can recognize their 
place within the legal system and possess some basic knowledge of how to 
                                                        
6 For examples of such research, see Dan M. Kahan, “More Statistics, Less Persuasion, A Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions” Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository 106 (2003): 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/106. Or, Joel Brockner, et al, “The Influence of Prior 
Commitment to an Institution on Reactions to Perceived Unfairness: They Higher They Are, The 
Harder They Fall,” Administrative Science Quarterly 37, no. 2 (1992). 
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maneuver within it. There are many advantages to contributing an active role to our 
citizens. For instance, it would help reveal the flaws and complexities of the existing 
laws while also making our legal system more efficient. The former advantage shall 
be explained in depth in chapter three where I argue that the input of the ordinary 
citizens is an important step in making good laws because hearing people’s views on 
different topics will reveal points about our laws and policies which may otherwise 
have gone unnoticed. The active role of the people is constituted by their interaction 
with the law as beings who understand the law, and react to it accordingly. The legal 
culture that considers the public to be merely passive subjects – who are to obey the 
law as it is presented to them without any basic understanding of it – cannot 
prosper or become better: the best that can be hoped for is obedience to existing 
laws. Later chapters discuss the issues and dangers that come up in the absence of 
such understanding. The model which I will put forward in this thesis goes beyond 
participation of individuals in the state through democracy. It requires a basic yet 
substantial understanding of the direction and underlying reasons for law, which go 
well beyond keeping individuals in line through incentives and punishment, as we 
will see in the next chapter.  
 Finally a last point of clarification must be made before moving on the next 
chapters: I would like to discuss – in more depth - what it means for a legal state to 
be efficient and fair as fairness and efficiency are the two standards according to 
which I will be evaluating the merits of our legal system. As mentioned before, 
efficiency, in this context, is measured by the ability to achieve one’s end in a way 
that is most productive and least wasteful: so our legal system would count as more 
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or less efficient to the extent that it makes use of societal resources to achieve its 
end.7 As far as the standards of fairness are concerned, in this context they don’t go 
far beyond ensuring that one party does not have an unjustified advantage over 
another party. In a democratic legal state, an example of an unjustified advantage 
held by the legislative body would be for it to draft laws arbitrarily without any kind 
of explanation while each member of that body benefited from those laws, at the 
expense of the general population. An unjustified advantage of the general public, on 
the other hand, would be for them to have the ability to oust, or annihilate, any part 
of the legislative system, at any time for no valid reasons. By contrast, other 
advantages - such as people’s right to vote in elections or the delegation of law-
making to people with the proper education and expertise - are examples of justified 
advantages enjoyed by different constituents of a legal democratic state. Thus, to say 
that our aim is to create a more fair legal state is to recognize and remedy the former 
kind of advantages. 
1.6 An overview of the chapters to come 
 Two points are important to flag at this point. First, the method I have chosen 
to use in laying the basic legal knowledge that I am advocating is certainly based on 
my own research and my personal case. I consider it to be a justified method 
because it is one that requires relatively small steps on the part of our educators 
while producing great benefits for our state and its people. Second, through that 
method I wish to add to the content of legal theory by pointing out the kind of 
                                                        
7 The purpose and goal of our laws will be discussed at length in chapter three. Also, while a 
maximum level of efficiency, in this context, remains an ideal that is beyond the scope of the present 
work, it is possible to point out ways in which we can make the legal system more efficient than it is 
presently.  
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positive difference that educating our citizens as active members of the state – as 
described earlier – could bring about.    
 To demonstrate and further describe the model that has been outlined here, 
three major questions will be addressed in the following chapters: 1) What is the 
foundation and structure of law? 2) What constitutes the content and purpose of 
law? 3) What role do people play within a legal system? Addressing these questions 
will take us well into some major debates about what law has been historically, 
what it is, and what it ought to be. It’s important to note that the treatment of these 
questions will be both descriptive and normative. The goal is to learn from what has 
been shown to be wrong while noting some of what can be done to improve our 
legal system: consideration of legal theories is one way to achieve that goal. As shall 
be shown, valid answers to these three questions not only demonstrate how an 
increase in the knowledge and awareness of ordinary people regarding our legal 
system is crucial: they also highlight the dangers and fallouts which ensue from a 
lack of such knowledge, and the continuation of a system that treats the public as 
mere subjects.  
 Chapter two will present a consideration of the dangers that we face as a 
society of individuals who do not have a basic understanding of the structure of 
foundation of law. The discussion shall include an overview of three major legal 
theories: natural law theory, positivism, and the interpretivist school of thought. I 
maintain that a basic study of some historically important legal theories and where 
they go wrong would help in  achieving two valuable goals: 1) it would help 
ordinary citizens correct many misconceptions that currently have about law by 
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showing them the many different forms and meanings that the law can bear in 
different situations 2) it would help give citizens a better perspective of their place, 
powers and opportunities within a legal state. Those in turn will encourage more 
accurate beliefs regarding what can be done in a conflicted legal situation and which 
could lead to constructive action from the people in correcting injustice. 
 Chapter three will describe the relationship between the purpose and 
content of law while highlighting the central role of interpretation within that 
relationship. It will be argued that people’s understanding and use of interpretation 
is what tips the scale of justice to one side or the other. As it was done in chapter 
two, some of the ways in which a misunderstanding or lack of knowledge of the 
relationship between the purpose and content of law risks to create and support 
injustice will be considered.   
 After having demonstrated the importance of legal literacy for the people and 
for the welfare of our legal system, chapter four will go on to lay out the details of 
some institutional changes that we should implement in our society – especially 
within the education system. An analogy will be drawn between some recent 
changes that have been made in our health-care system and similar changes that we 
could hope to see within our legal system. It’s been said time and again that 
“knowledge is power.” It’s time for us to apply that to our legal system and those 
affected by it.   
 Before closing this chapter, it is important to take some time to explain the 
relation between the philosophical, the political and the legal theories that will be 
discussed throughout this thesis. There is a two-way relationship between political 
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theories, as well as political changes that take place within our society, and the legal 
changes or decisions that are made. Politics affect law and law affects politics: that 
much is uncontroversial. So, that is why I allude to some political philosophers and 
their theories to discuss legal matters in the following chapters. The topics that are 
discussed within philosophy of law serve as theoretical guidelines concerning the 
changes that could or should be put into place to improve both the legal and the 
political realms. Thus, philosophical theories affect – or could provide the grounds 
and reasons for change – within our political system while political theories explain 
why and how such changes are significant. Moreover, philosophy of law is seen as a 
subset of political philosophy and in that sense, the discussion of the two is not only 
adequate but in many ways crucial.  
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Chapter Two 
The Foundation and Structure of Law 
 The structure and foundation of law directly determine its function and 
mode of operation within each society. In fact, knowing what constitutes the 
foundation and structure of a legal system reveals the first hints about important 
sources of legal mistakes that occur despite people’s best intentions. This chapter 
aims to show the crucial role that a basic knowledge of the foundation and structure 
of law plays in the realization of a more fair and efficient legal state.8 It argues that 
learning about the structure and foundation of law gives people the power to 
assume a more active role within their society and thereby helps ensure the 
realization of justice and fairness. In that sense, learning about different structures 
and basis of law is like learning from history: it reminds us of what has gone wrong 
in different conceptions of the structure and foundation of law while familiarizing us 
with their methods of operation, which in turn helps clarify the role and duty of the 
people of any given society vis-à-vis their legal system.   
While we cannot reasonably expect everyone to have the knowledge of an 
expert in legal matters; it is possible and necessary that ordinary people have a 
general idea about the foundation and structure of the kind of law that reigns over 
their society. What constitutes the boundaries of a general understanding in this 
context? I claim that the general understanding necessary for a more fair and 
efficient legal state does not exceed what will be presented in this thesis.  
                                                        
8 The standards of efficiency have already been laid out in chapter one: they refer to producing the 
best outcomes with the least amount of waste.  
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Before diving into an overview of different kinds of legal theories that shape 
the structure and foundation of law, it is important to consider how knowledge of 
such structures, or lack thereof, affect our lives and our society. That is the aim and 
focus of the following section.   
2.1 How Lack of Legal Knowledge Distorts People’s Perception of Important 
Issues and Worsens Them: Misunderstanding the Foundation of Law 
Before seeking remedies, we need to consider the kind and extent of 
damages that are being caused by a lack of understanding of the basis and structure 
of a legal system, on the part of the people. An example of the negative effects of 
such an ignorance is described in an article titled, “Rough Justice in America: too 
many laws, too many prisoners,” published last year in The Economist. This article 
tells the heart-breaking story of a legal system that’s being used wrongly and a 
population that’s contributing to its misuse, through no inherent fault of their own.  
The article starts by pointing out the problem of high incarceration in the 
USA: “In 1970 the proportion of Americans behind bars was below one in 400, 
compared with today’s one in 100.”9 The figures are alarming for a few reasons, 
which will be discussed shortly: “between 2.3 million and 2.4 million Americans are 
behind bars, roughly one in every 100 adults.”10 The stats inform us that: “As a 
                                                        
9 “Rough Justice in America: Too many laws, Too many Prisoners,” The Economist, Print Edition, July 
22nd, 2010: http://www.economist.com/node/16636027  
10 Ibid.   
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proportion of its total population, America incarcerates five times more people than 
Britain, nine times more than Germany and twelve times more than Japan.”11 
The problem is not only that many individuals are being imprisoned – and 
having their lives turned upside down as a result – the equally worrisome part of the 
problem is that high incarceration has created a misperception, amongst voters, of a 
corresponding increase in crime. This misperception about the real connection 
between crime and imprisonment has become the starting point of a vicious circle 
that has worsened the issue of incarceration by encouraging it. One may argue that 
the lack of knowledge about how the legal system works has driven the American 
people away from considering that maybe it is their laws or law enforcement 
entities that are just too harsh on criminals of small or large scale. This is a blatant 
example of misuse of a legal system that is – amongst other things - there to ensure 
justice and safety; instead, people are being imprisoned for long periods of time 
because of what may be considered ‘small crimes’ that could be dealt with through 
alternative and less drastic measures, and in addition to that the population is 
feeling unsafe.  
The toughness of criminal laws in the U.S.A. is partly explained by the voters’ 
demand from the politicians to take a fiercer stand on crime: seeing the growing 
population of people in prisons, ordinary people have drawn the conclusion that a 
tougher approach to crime is what is necessary. People’s ignorant opinion about the 
nature of their legal system has led to unreasonable demands and societal changes 
                                                        
11 “Rough Justice in America: Too many laws, Too many Prisoners,” The Economist, Print Edition, July 
22nd, 2010: http://www.economist.com/node/16636027 
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that have ended up working against them as a group. It is not hard to see how a 
basic understanding of punishment – and how or why laws are enforced - could 
change the perception and demands of the population regarding different legal 
measures.12 Or, alternatively, how it might keep them out of legal trouble. The 
bottom line is that the American legal system has undergone negative changes, such 
as the transfer of power from qualified judges to politicians who are less qualified in 
legal matters, because people have made unreasonable demands as a result of their 
lack of understanding of law, its foundation and structure.13 
This ignorance has bled through people’s daily lives and is continuing to have 
severe consequences for them. The article mentioned above tells the story of a 
woman who was imprisoned for selling Percocet, a moderate painkiller. In an 
attempt to explain her act, she said: “I was planning to do it just once…and I thought 
it’s not heroin.”14 The judge was obliged to give her a heavier sentence than he saw 
fit because his power to decide cases based on his trained expertise has been limited 
through recent – structural - changes in the American legal system which 
transferred a certain amount of power from judges to politicians. Thus, this young 
woman was sentenced to go to prison for seven years, for a problem that could have 
been dealt with by much less harsh measures. In fact, the judge mentioned: “‘Had I 
                                                        
12 An American judge expressed during a ruling, that: “it’s going to cost upwards of $50,000 a year to 
have [someone] in state prison.” It is my view that, with a better understanding of law - its function 
and structure - many more individuals would challenge the wisdom of that kind of spending. See 
“Rough Justice in America: Too many laws, Too many Prisoners,” The Economist, Print Edition, July 
22nd, 2010: http://www.economist.com/node/16636027 
13 “Rough Justice in America: Too many laws, Too many Prisoners,” The Economist, Print Edition, July 
22nd, 2010: http://www.economist.com/node/16636027 
14 “Rough Justice in America: Too many laws, Too many Prisoners,” The Economist, Print Edition, July 
22nd, 2010: http://www.economist.com/node/16636027 
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the authority, I would send [her] to jail for no more than one year…and a 
[treatment] programme after that.’ But mandatory sentencing laws gave him no 
choice.”15  
2.2 Misunderstanding the structure of Law 
 The problem has been exacerbated by the vagueness and multitude of laws –
mostly because there is no clear understanding, amongst ordinary people, of what 
role the law, and law enforcers, are there to fulfill: “The system has three big flaws, 
say criminologists. First, it puts too many people away for too long. Second, it 
criminalizes acts that need not be criminalized. Third, it is unpredictable. Many laws, 
especially federal ones, are so vaguely written that people cannot easily tell whether 
they have broken them.”16 These critics thus point out the existing structural 
problems within the executive and judicial parts of the American legal system and it 
is true that there are structural problems within the legal system, but I maintain that 
people’s ignorance of such problems has only made the situation worse by feeding a, 
now established, mode of operation within the legal system which was not intended 
by the original design of the American legal system17, if we consider the 
preservation of order and safety as two of those original goals. The consequences of 
legal ignorance constitute a perceptible fact that needs immediate attention.  
                                                        
15 Ibid.  
16 “Rough Justice in America: Too many laws, Too many Prisoners,” The Economist, Print Edition, July 
22nd, 2010: http://www.economist.com/node/16636027   
17 ‘The established mode of operation’ refers to the situation in which misperception leads to 
enforcement of bad legal practices, such as excessive imprisonment, as described earlier.  
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 Similar examples abound in Canada as well: the issue regarding the 
treatment of transgender individuals in the workplace is one amongst many.18 One 
of the biggest debates regarding transgender individuals has been about their right 
to use the same facilities as those designated for the gender that they represent. 
Many institutions, especially those in the private sector, do not allow transsexual 
women to use women’s bathrooms due to fear of litigation which may result from 
the expressed discomfort of other employees. These institutions argue that the mere 
presence of a transgender female (a male who identifies himself with the female 
gender) creates a perceived threat to other women and children. However, a basic 
legal understanding would reveal that fear of litigation, in these cases, is not 
justified. In fact, The Ontario Human Rights Commission recognizes the following: 
"…during, and after the period of transition, the issue of gender segregated facilities 
and services might arise. The individual should be able to use the facilities of the 
gender with which he or she identifies. Segregation is rarely appropriate unless the 
individual has specifically requested it. This is because segregation may reinforce 
myths that transgenderism is ‘freakish’, that transgendered people should keep 
their distance, or that they are objects of curiosity that should be kept separate from 
everyone else. In some instances, the individual making the transition prefers or 
requests a separate washroom until the period of transition is complete. However, if 
this accommodation is imposed and not requested by the person it may undermine 
their dignity."19 
  
 Yet, transgendered individuals still have to fight to have their rights 
recognized. A pre-operative male-to-female transsexual who was denied access to 
the female washroom in a nightclub filed a human rights claim and the Tribunal 
decided in her faavour, stating that “discrimination against a transsexual constitutes 
                                                        
18 Special thanks to Dr. Rachel R. McKinnon for raising this issue in relation to the topic at hand.  
19 “Policy on Discrimination and Harassment because of Gender Identity,” Ontario Human Rights 
Commission, ISBN : 0-7794-0119-0 (2000): http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resources/Policies/PolicyGenderIdent   
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discrimination because of sex.”20 What we must ask ourselves, as a society, is: why is 
it that, in a country where laws protecting sex and gender have come such a long 
way, a group of individuals still have to fight to have those same rights recognized? 
Or worse yet, why should they have to fight against the outright denial of these 
rights? The severity of this problem should be evident: the ability to lead a normal 
life – along with the dignity – of a group of people is being trumped by a not well 
justified fear of litigation (by companies and institutions) and, worse yet, by our 
government’s failure to recognize the place of this group’s claims within the 
Canadian constitution.21 A legal education regarding the structure and foundation of 
the law would allow companies and other institutions to deal with issues relating to 
the treatment of transgendered individuals, and similar cases, with more ease and 
confidence. Meanwhile, an educated population would place more pressure on its 
government to recognize these rights in fundamental and structural ways.   
 Similar processes are seen in our education system, where a lack of legal 
knowledge - paired with fear of litigation - is increasingly shaping our schools’ and 
educators’ way of teaching.22 This pertains especially to teachers since they often 
have to make instantaneous decisions: for them the probability of making “wrong” 
                                                        
20 John Ibbitson, “Transgendered-rigts bill headed for defeat in Tory-held Senate,” The Globe and Mail, 
February 10th, 2011: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/transgendered-rights-bill-
headed-for-defeat-in-tory-held-senate/article1902266/    
21 According to Transport Canada’s “Identity Screening Regulations,” an airline is not allowed to 
transport a passenger who appears to be a different gender than what is listed on their official travel 
document. This regulation goes not only against Canadians’ basic right to mobility; it also effectively 
bans transgendered individuals who haven’t completed a sex change operation or who live their life 
as a different gender than the one specified on their passport from flying. See “Transgendered People 
are Completely Banned from Boarding Airplanes in Canada” Christin Milloy: Toward a brighter future, 
for all humanity (blog), February 2nd, 2012, http://chrismilloy.ca/2012/01/transgender-people-are-
completely-banned-from-boarding-airplanes-in-canada/  
22 Troy A. Davis, “The Worrisome State of Legal Literacy among Teachers and Administrators,” 
Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education 2, no. 1 (2009). 
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decisions is much higher since what they say or their approach to a given topic 
could stir controversy, which could then lead to personal and enduring lawsuits. In 
these cases, it is important to raise awareness about associations such as The 
Canadian Association for the Practical Study of Law in Education (CAPSLE) that 
provide a forum for studying legal issues as they pertain to education.23 The 
immediate and long-term impact of education on the population make this issue a 
pressing one as a poor quality education has direct and dire consequences on so 
many different levels: it would be a shame for our education to suffer due to our 
educators’ fear of litigation.  
 These are just a few examples of how uncertainty regarding the structure 
and foundation of law, on the part of the people, companies and our educators has 
created an obstacle for the full realization of justice and social growth in our society.  
 However, one may still question the degree of helpfulness of learning 
abstract concepts - such as the foundations and structure of law - in ordinary 
citizens’ day-to-day affairs. While it is true that such knowledge will not guard 
citizens from all legal problems, it will serve as a compass that guides them through 
legal situations. For instance, knowing what constitutes the foundation and 
structure of a legal system helps rule out certain possibilities and allows people to 
consider others. In fact such general knowledge is helpful on personal, social, and 
political grounds. On a personal level, it at least shows people how and where they 
could get help when they are confronted with problems while also decreasing the 
                                                        
23 Capsle, Canadian Association for Practical Study of Law in Education, March 12th, 2012, 
http://www.capsle.ca/index.php?lang=1&menid=01&mtyp=3.  
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feeling of helplessness which comes with the lack of that kind of knowledge. On a 
social level, awareness of what constitutes the basis of our legal system affects 
people’s and groups’ interaction with one another; for instance, the efforts of 
companies that capitalize on the ignorance of the general population would largely 
fail, or at least be reliably reduced. On a political level, such knowledge would lead 
citizens to see social phenomena, such as excessive imprisonment, for what they 
really are, and as a result, it would help them cast more educated votes and support 
better politicians and social programs. All these changes would improve the daily 
lives of the citizens. Therefore, it is simply not true that abstract knowledge about 
the basis of a legal system is not helpful for individuals on a personal and collective 
level.  
2.3 An overview of three major legal theories  
This section includes an overview of three historically significant legal 
theories: natural law theory, positivism as well as the interpretivist theory of law. 
The aim in discussing these theories is to see where they have gone wrong while 
also underlying important elements that form the structure and foundation of good 
legal systems. That knowledge will show us that without citizens’ involvement in the 
legal system, our society risks becoming unfair and inefficient in its functioning.  
Some reflection and a close study of these three legal theories reveals a 
common thread that runs through them: interpretation. Undoubtedly, different 
theories use interpretation in different ways. But what remains constant is the 
seminal role that interpretation plays in each legal theory and its enactment. 
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Recognizing the role that interpretation plays in the structure and foundation of a 
legal system sheds light on some venues for action which would otherwise remain 
unknown to the ordinary citizens. I submit that it is the knowledge of various roles 
that interpretation fulfills in each legal system that can serve as a good basis for a 
general understanding that will help people achieve a better understanding of the 
laws, which will in turn make for a more efficient and fair legal state.  
How could the recognition of the place of interpretation in law help ordinary 
citizens achieve fairness in their society? An analogy should help answer that 
question: an analogy between a legal state and sports games. The players are an 
integral part of any sports team: without them there would be no team and no game 
to play. The players represent the people of the state, without people there would be 
no state or country to begin with. The laws of the state are analogous to the rules of 
the game: the players need to know and understand the rules of the game they are 
playing in order to play correctly and well. Knowledge of the rules allows for the 
conception of strategies and better play. Similarly, people need to know the laws of 
their land if they are to contribute to its order and prosperity. However, the best 
players and the best citizens understand the basis of the entity – or the game – of 
which they are a part. Since interpretation shapes the rules of the game and the laws 
of the land, it is crucial for the players, just as it is for the citizens, to have an 
awareness and understanding of the changes that are brought about by 
interpretation. For example, good soccer players are aware of all the ways in which 
their positioning could lead to and offside call. In other words, they know how the 
referees could interpret their moves. Similarly, citizens need to have a basic 
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knowledge of how different laws may apply to different situations.  Notice that in 
sports mere knowledge of the rules or laws is not sufficient when most teams have 
an advanced understanding of the dynamics of the rules of the game; similarly, in a 
fast-changing world, merely knowing the laws of a given society without 
understanding how different interpretations affect them is not sufficient for a fair 
and happy state, although it is a necessary step towards achieving that state.  
Now that we have established the reasons for the importance of the 
knowledge of the foundation and structure of law in the betterment of society, it is 
time to examine different legal theories and the role that interpretation plays within 
each. For each theory, we will study the role of interpretation in methodology, 
scope, and determinacy24 as well as the intent of the legislators.25 A consideration of 
these points serves as a nice method in understanding the structure and foundation 
of each legal theory. Methodology reveals the methods through which law is 
conceived, determinacy draws the boundaries of the system in question, while the 
intent of the legislators expresses the priorities of those who support the legal 
theory in question. These constitute three venues through which important changes 
are brought about in a legal state. Therefore, the knowledge of them is important for 
citizens’ protection and practice of choice.  
 
 
                                                        
24 Determinacy, in this context, refers to the extent to which the legal system can constrain, dictate or 
guide our actions and choices in life.  
25 This approach has been inspired by Andrei Marmor’s approach in his book Law and Interpretation: 
Essays in Legal Philosophy, 1995.  
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2.4 Methodology of Natural Law  
The oldest theory of law is that of natural law. Broadly construed, natural law 
claims that law is determined by a set of principles. Different variations of natural 
law theory differ in what they believe the source of these principles to be. Some saw 
it in the word of God and religion. This was the view of Thomas Aquinas: he 
conceived natural law as humans’ participation in the eternal law that was created 
by God.26 Other variations of natural law saw the origin of these principles in the 
order of the universe, without necessarily mentioning the existence of a divinity: 
Plato and Aristotle advocated this kind of view. Plato spoke of the forms while 
Aristotle claimed that individuals should be educated to achieve virtue and live in 
harmony with the order of the universe.27  
More recent proponents of natural law have claimed that the principles that 
determine law are discovered through the use of reason: the idea is that human 
reason can analyze the nature of individuals and the world and find in it the rules 
and obligations that bind individuals to society and to each other. John Finnis’ 
theory, covered later in this chapter, is one amongst these theories. The difference 
between this last view and that of Plato and Aristotle is that the latter presupposed a 
determinate kind of order to exist in the universe; the former makes no such claim, 
instead holding a more agnostic view about the existence of a predetermined order 
in the universe. The kind of natural law that relies on human rationality to discover 
                                                        
26 Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics, Translated by William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2002), Chapter II.  
27 Plato, “Phaedo” in Plato, Complete Works, John M. Cooper ed., D.S. Hutchison Associate ed. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 49. Also see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. 
Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999). 
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laws relies solely on our ability to reason well. The acceptance of this view raises 
important questions about the determinacy and scope of laws. However, before 
addressing those questions, it’s important to evaluate the methodologies that have 
been proposed so far.  
To better understand these methods we can consider them according to two 
different conceptions of realism. In understanding the theories of Aquinas, Plato and 
Aristotle, it is helpful to consider Dummet’s formulation of realism. Dummet states: 
“the primary tenet of realism, as applied to some given class of statements, is that 
each statement in the class is determined as true or not true, independently of our 
knowledge, by some objective reality whose existence and constitution is, again, 
independent of our knowledge.”28 The implication of this method is that claims to 
legality are either true or false, with no grey zone in between. What’s more is that 
the truth-value of these claims distinguishes actions as either lawful or unlawful in 
accordance with a higher and independent authority. Societies that embrace this 
method equate lawfulness with goodness and correctness while considering 
unlawfulness as incorrect. Law and morality are one and the same in these societies 
and, more importantly, according to these theories moral pluralism is a myth.  
Moral pluralism – also referred to as value pluralism – is defined, in general 
terms, as the view that many different moral values exist and are valid, even though 
they may contradict one another. One of the basic debates in moral pluralism 
concerns the reducibility of moral values: i.e., whether moral values are all reducible 
                                                        
28 Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and legal theory (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005), 66. 
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to one super-value or whether there are really several distinct moral values, existing 
independently of one another.29 Some proponents of value pluralism, like William 
Galston, have claimed that not all values are commensurable: they may neither be 
reduced to one super value nor ranked in order of importance.30 There may just be 
independent and conflicting values that could be considered equally good. His 
theory considers value pluralism in relation to liberalism as a political theory. 
However, for our purposes it is important to not that from the perspective of 
traditional natural law theory, one of the main problems with moral pluralism is its 
lack of distinct limits in what could be considered a value: such problems could arise 
for theories of people like Galston. This is because older versions of natural law 
theory conceived determinate limits to what could be considered a value, or as 
good; whereas, within withing certain conceptions of moral pluralism, there is room 
to argue for or against the validity of different values.  
We can already see how by rejection of moral pluralism, divine natural law 
can create tension and clashes amongst people holding different belief systems. 
Divine natural law thus limits the possibility of action for the people, since any 
objections they make can be considered as an act against the law.  
On the other hand, the newer kind of natural law theory – which relies on 
reason to discover laws - is more flexible while taking a different kind of realist 
approach. Realism, in this context, claims to report facts as they happen; in other 
                                                        
29 Mason, Elinor, "Value Pluralism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/value-pluralism/. 
30 William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 48-60. 
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words, moral claims are taken to be right if they accord with how things really are. 
This form of realism departs from Dummett’s version of realism which was 
described earlier. According to newer conceptions of natural law theory, it is 
completely reasonable to assume that A could be reduced to B or C in certain 
circumstances, while still carrying distinct characteristics of A.31 In other words, the 
same laws could apply differently in different circumstances while still carrying the 
same core principles and meanings.  
Laws of censorship and copyright are two examples amongst many. While 
the core idea underlying copyright laws is the protection of intellectual and creative 
property, censorship laws restrict the use and propagation of information, for 
different reasons (often under the pretense of protecting the population). The basic 
purpose of these laws is manifested differently in each situation, sometimes to 
people’s dismay. For instance, many have objected to Canada’s Bill C-32, which 
places “digital locks” on the use and propagation of information, claiming that this 
form of censorship stifles creativity and ruins Canada’s chance to distinguish itself in 
a digital world.  Michael Geist, one of these critics and a professor of law at 
University of Ottawa, has been vocal in expressing his discontent with this bill.32 On 
the other hand, less business-minded artists have found themselves in agreement 
                                                        
31 This relates to Putnam’s use of the indexical to refer to different things that bear similar 
characteristics. See Hilary Putnam, “The meaning of ‘meaning’” in Mind, Language and Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 215.   
32 Scott Simpson, “Canadian laws would have prevented YouTube, Google from emerging here, e-prof 
laments,” The Vocouver Sun: Innovation (Blog), November 1st, 2011 (10:18 am), 
http://blogs.vancouversun.com/2011/11/01/canadian-laws-would-have-stopped-youtube-google-
from-emerging-here-e-prof-laments/    
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with the terms of Bill C-32, seeing it as a way of protecting the value of their work.33 
Thus, laws of censorship and copyright take different forms while still holding their 
core purpose and values. It’s also worthwhile to note that laws, such as those of 
censorship and copyright, can have different manifestations under the newer 
conception of natural law theory because valid changes in our reasoning should be 
reflected in our laws, based on this view. 
2.5 Scope and determinacy of Natural Law  
It is important to note that, for the variations of natural law which are not 
focused on rationality as the source of law, the original source of natural law - be it 
God, nature, religion or the holy book - is regarded as the standard for rationality. 
This is a noteworthy distinction: saying that rationality is the source of law is a 
broad claim that is in theory meant to include an objective use of reason; in practice, 
it leads to the adaptation of the kind of instrumental rationality that finds its way to 
power or is embraced by most people. This is an important distinction as it shows 
structural changes that depart from the original conception of the theory of natural 
law, and it’s important that people recognize that in protecting their rights. On the 
other hand, saying that divine revelation or the determinate order of the universe 
are the standards of rationality - for judging individuals’ acts and legal cases - is to 
adopt a very narrow meaning of rationality which does not easily allow other 
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worldviews to affect or change those principles. Let us call the former “rational 
natural law” and the latter “divine natural law”.   
 The question now is: what is the scope and power of determinacy of each 
theory? Historically, divine natural law could mean burning at the stake those who 
committed major offences. This was mostly because there was no room for 
negotiating with what those in power claimed divine natural law dictated. Both the 
scope and determinacy of the laws were narrow and defined. In the modern world 
however, interpretation has come to play a major role even in systems that embrace 
divine natural law. An example of that is seen in the case of Islamic countries where 
religion and the state are still not separate on a social and political level in a 
significant manner. In those countries, different interpretations of how Islam 
requires women to dress have led to different laws to that effect. In Iran, women 
have to cover their hair and dress in loose clothing in public places. In parts of 
Afghanistan, women have to wear the burqa, covering their whole body except for a 
small opening for the eyes. The rules of both countries are said to be based on 
Islam’s commandments; but they are clearly the result of different interpretations of 
Islam, if we consider the official reasoning that is offered for such rules and forget 
the socio-political reasons that have probably inspired them. For now, suffice to 
note that adopting divine natural law theory has and does lead to different kinds of 
laws nowadays, and that is interesting, considering the determinate and unchanging 
nature which the original proponents of natural law theory imagined for it. In other 
words, interpretation seems inescapable.   
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2.6 Scope and Determinacy of Rational Natural Law  
 Even though their methods are different, the results of both kinds of natural 
law converge. That is what is established as law is the result of society’s 
interpretation of what it considers the independent and higher source for law. The 
limits and determinacy of rational natural law are determined by the power and 
validity of reasons that support it: thus, there is usually more room for change 
within this kind of natural law than in divine natural law. It is interesting to note the 
malleability of laws within each system, despite appearances of unchangeability and 
determinacy. We can already observe how knowledge of the foundation of natural 
law would affect the lives and decisions of the people living under such systems: 
divine and rational natural law do have room for change based on their own 
standards. As Andrei Marmor expresses, in relation to a realist account of law, which 
natural law falls under: “Law must have a critical aspect, as it were, which may, or 
may not, be recognized correctly by the pertinent agents.”34 Where the government 
fails to acknowledge the role and place of the people’s view within the legal system, 
with a pertinent and basic legal literacy people can realize that there is real hope for 
change to come about: that belief could lead to action on the part of the people 
which would then place pressure on governments and thereby stop at least some 
unjust events from occurring, on large or small scales – and that is something 
worthwhile to strive for.35 Marmor’s claim regarding the critical aspect of law  
                                                        
34 Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and legal theory (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005), 74. 
35 Please note that I am not implying that the realization that there is hope will change a legal society 
over night as there are surely other aspects such as socioeconomic and political issues within each 
society that contribute to its problems. Rather people’s realization of their role and power is a first 
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stands independently of whether or not governments acknowledge it. Of course, 
anyone who has witnessed the rule of natural law can attest to the fact that the 
possibility for change and flexibility of laws are not usually highly advertised in 
those societies; on the contrary, natural law regimes often put tremendous 
propaganda efforts into making people believe that law is one and unchanging. In a 
sense, such regimes misrepresent the structure and foundation of their legal system 
for the sake of keeping political power and control over the people. That is why it is 
so important for more people to recognize this misrepresentation for what it really 
is. 
 But it seems like more needs to be known about the intentions and direction 
of those in favour of natural law theory before we can judge their project as a 
worthy or unworthy foundation for law. After all, repressive regimes as well as 
many human rights activists rely on natural law arguments to advance their goals.    
2.7 The Intention of Natural Legislators  
 The notion of intention has a long and complicated history in philosophy, not 
to mention multiple meanings. For our purposes, intention will designate the 
expressed aims of an agent: i.e., what the agent expresses to be their goal. I am 
leaving unexpressed other forms of intentions, because their discussion would lead 
us well into psychology and away from legal philosophy. What is important for our 
purposes is the consideration of how the knowledge of expressed intentions of a 
government, in conjunction with the legal theory used by that government, affects 
                                                                                                                                                                     
step to be taken towards change for the better, especially considering the existing relation between 
improvement within any legal system and the social and political changes that could follow from it.    
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ordinary people’s lives and decisions.  The big question is whether or not the 
intentions of the government are consistent with the kind of legal theory that it 
supports. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) lists a number of rights 
and privileges that many nations have vowed to safeguard: the protection of these 
rights is therefore the intention of most countries, which makes these rights a good 
standard for the aptness of any legal theory and system. Does natural law theory, as 
a legal theory, support the structures that protect human rights and thus fulfill the 
government’s duty to ordinary people? Let’s take the following article of the UDHR 
as a standard: “20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.”36 It 
immediately becomes clear that, in any country where divine natural law reigns, and 
people do not enjoy freedom of religion, their human right is being violated: because 
they have at least one association chosen for them without their input.  
 There are other inconsistencies between natural law theory and expressed 
intentions of governments. The first problem is internal inconsistency within divine 
natural law: i.e., the different understandings and beliefs that exist with regards to 
“the word of God.” That’s problematic because a fundamental assumption of divine 
natural law is that it leads to a set of determinate principles. However, in practice, 
the element of interpretation has rendered divine natural law doubtful because 
divine commandments often take varying and even contradicting forms even within 
                                                        
36 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 20,” The United Nations, accessed March 21st, 
2012, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a20.   
 
  46 
the same religion. The second problem is external inconsistency: different people 
have different religious views that are based on beliefs backed by faith alone. That 
makes it very difficult to determine which religious view should be adopted as the 
basis of law. The differences in religious views make cohabitation of people with 
different religious beliefs at best difficult and at worst impossible, under divine 
natural law. But the real problem arises when the laws of the land infringe upon 
individuals’ liberty to follow their own religious views. It is hard to come up with a 
valid reason that proves one religion to be better than the other. The question could 
arise: why should we take Islam, and not Christianity, as the basis of law? 
Furthermore, the proclamation of ‘new’ religions could render the task of managing 
the state virtually impossible.     
 Rational natural law is also problematic when it becomes fixated on one form 
of rationality alone. It is clear that rationality relies on observation, which is heavily 
influenced by one’s worldview. The issue is that our culture and environment 
predispose us to have a certain understanding of our world and sometimes we may 
find ourselves locked in a certain worldview without realizing it. This could, and has 
in some places, led to the imposition of certain associations against ordinary 
people’s free will. In fact, rational natural law presents us with the same problem as 
divine natural law, with a minor difference: divine natural law relies on values 
determined by God whereas rational natural law relies on values determined by a 
group of people: the legislators or those in power. Depending on the dynamics of the 
politics of the country in question, the reasoning of the legislators may or may not be 
faced with major opposition. For that reason, a functional use of rational natural law 
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theory requires an open system that considers various views in a fair manner.  Only 
in that case could we hope for consistency between protection of people’s rights, 
such as freedom of association and the form of the government. 
 However, the more serious problem for rational natural law theory is its 
attempt to deduce prescriptive claims from descriptive states. This issue is directly 
related to Hume’s problem of induction and causality. Hume reminds us that, just 
because a series of events have always been observed to occur in a certain way, we 
can not assume they will always occur in the same way. Similarly, basing laws on 
what we have observed to be “the nature of the world” is an imperfect method that 
is in need of qualification. It is true that theories of probability have shown the level 
of certainty with which we could predict future events. And certain laws, such as 
those protecting property, are certainly a result of what we have learned from 
previous experience. However, the future-oriented nature of some laws - as well as 
their dealings with complex beings such as ourselves - make it difficult always to 
form accurate predictions merely on descriptive grounds. Here, we see the 
importance of allowing interpretation within a good legal system. In the same 
context, also important to consider are the moral issues that follow from a 
translation of ‘is’ to ‘ought’: more will be said on this issue when we discuss the 
place of morality in law.   For now, we must note the crucial role that interpretation, 
by people and the government, plays in making rational natural law fair and 
efficient; without interpretation this system is susceptible to wrong turns. 
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It is difficult but possible to speak of the foundations and structure of natural 
law theory without discussing the purpose of law more generally.37 However, there 
is a way to set the foundation of natural law so that it: a) does not come in conflict 
with people’s personal beliefs; while b) it tailors to the particularities of different 
cases. John Finnis, whose theory has been characterized as a kind of “neo-
naturalism” has proposed to take objective goods as the source of the principles on 
which law should be based. More precisely, his claim is that practical reason must 
start from a set of objective goods that are not extracted from descriptive accounts, 
but contribute to “forms of human flourishing.”38 He claims that such principles are 
self-evident and discovered through the use of practical reason. According to his 
account, the good is independent of our desires: while desires could be irrational, 
the good is a part of rationality. It is very important to put the good, derived from 
the objective goods of life, before the right to ensure that the law serves the common 
good without imposing any views on people. That means that law in its foundation 
must focus on what everyone considers to be good, not what different views 
consider to be the right option. Finnis gives examples of these objective goods: life, 
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and 
religion.39 
While Finnis’ account gets past some of the problems that divine and rational 
natural law share - such as imposition of certain views on people and blockade of 
people’s personal goals - it still faces the problem of objectivity. There are indeed 
                                                        
37 Next chapter will add to this discussion by focusing on the purpose of law.  
38 John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 48-50. 
39 Ibid.  
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different kinds of objectivity and different ways of achieving objectivity: therefore, 
many individuals may find that there is room for debate within Finnis’ account of 
objective goods. Moreover, the broad character of these objective goods leaves 
much room for debate: the aesthetic, for example, has different definitions for 
different people. However, this problem may be only one of terminology. In fact, the 
replacement of the conception of objective goods with that of “universally valued 
goods” has the chance of redeeming Finnis’ account. There is something very 
appealing about taking universally valued principles as the basis of law-making and 
law enforcement. In this sense, law takes on the role of assuring the possibility of 
fulfilling and protecting values that are basic and important to most people, without 
taking away the practice of choice from people. Thus, universally valued goods must 
necessarily be a part of the foundations of a healthy legal system. The question is 
whether or not universally valued goods form sufficient grounds for a healthy legal 
structure? It seems that every society will still need laws that are particular to its 
culture and customs to protect its authenticity. And this is where we are reminded 
of the importance of an active approach from the part of the people.  
Thus, it seems like rational natural theory needs to be complemented by 
other theories or structures to be satisfying. Making room for widely shared cultural 
values in the foundation of law has had its supporters and opponents throughout 
the years. The issue is directly linked to the debate about the relation between 
morality and law: should we allow morality to be a part of law or should the two 
remain separate? The positivist theory of law strongly opposes the idea of mixing 
morality and law. In the following section we will consider some of the main 
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arguments of the distinguished H.L.A. Hart, as one of the main advocates of 
positivism. It is very important to note that Hart did not deny that the content of the 
laws could be inspired by different values and principles; rather, he claimed that 
moral reasoning does not constitute a necessary nor sufficient reason for validity of 
laws.40 What that implies is that moral reasons are not enough to turn an accepted 
rule into law and that laws could be made without any moral reasons supporting 
them. 
 This section partially concludes that rational natural theory could be an 
acceptable foundation for law: the definitive verdict will depend on the conclusions 
we reach about the place of morality within law and how feasible it is to protect 
basic liberties under a system that supports rational natural law. This presentation 
of natural law theory has hopefully revealed the many subtleties and implications 
that this theory carries: it should be clear that the knowledge of these points is an 
important step in forming an educated judgment about the foundations of a 
government and its policies which, in turn, determine the protection of individual 
and communal rights and privileges. 
2.8 Methodology of Legal Positivism  
 Positivism had its beginnings in the works of Jeremy Bentham and John 
Austin, who criticized proponents of natural law such as William Blackstone who 
saw the law as enforcement of natural rights. The main worry that positivists such 
as Bentham expressed about natural law theory was its confusion of two separate 
                                                        
40 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 181-195. 
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elements: 1) that of what the laws are; and 2) the merit of the laws, i.e. an evaluation 
of what they should be.41 In their view, conflating these two questions risked to 
bring under question the authority and effectiveness of the law. Positivists also 
considered the principles of natural law to be too indeterminate and difficult to 
know.  
 The positivists asserted that the law is what is written down, what is posited 
by human beings. We will call this view the ‘black letter view’. However, there are 
important distinctions and disputes even amongst positivists regarding the law and 
what it represents. For instance, Austin conceived law as a body of commands set 
forth by the sovereign, who is the body that is regularly obeyed by people. For him, 
obligation to do something meant the likelihood of being punished in the event of 
disobedience.42  
Others, such as H.L.A. Hart, brought forth a different conception of law and its 
terms. For Hart, punishment is only an auxiliary function of the law that in no way 
defines its core. In other words, Hart claims that there is more to law than just 
punishment and obedience. He compares law to orders backed by threats using his 
example of the gunman making threats to others, only to show that the example of 
the gunman (and analogous models) are obviously lacking in representing law. For 
Hart, what differentiates law from mere orders backed by threats is its internal 
                                                        
41 Jeremy Bentham, “Critique of the Doctrine of Inalienable, Natural Rights” in Anarchical Fallacies, vol. 
2, ed. L.B. Bowring, accessed February 5th, 2012, http://www.ditext.com/bentham/bentham.html.  
42 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble (Cambridge: The 
Cambridge University, 1995), 3-5.  
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acceptance by most people and its persistence through time.43 The orders of a 
gunman do not represent legal obligations; rather they oblige the individual(s) in 
question to follow the orders only momentarily; the force of the gunman’s demand 
is gone once the gun is dropped and the gunman is no longer present. In that sense 
there is only what Hart calls an external, i.e. observable, aspect to the “obligation” 
that the gunman imposes: his victims have no internal acceptance of what is being 
asked of them. Orders backed by threats miss the internal aspect that the concept of 
law enjoys: i.e., its authority and acceptance by people even in the absence of force.  
 One of the most seminal points that Hart makes is that law is sustained 
through a concept and a system. This concept could be best described as a legitimate 
authority that is sustained through a system. Hart explicitly defines law as the union 
of primary rules, i.e. rules as directives that tell us what to do and what not to do, 
and secondary rules, which basically specify how the primary rules are to be 
applied.44 It is thanks to this system of primary and secondary rules that law exists. 
The most important secondary rule is that of recognition, which recognizes the 
source of law as a set of precedents or statutes.45 That is the theoretical formulation 
of legal positivism. 
2.9 Some Important Subtleties of Legal Positivism   
In practice, the difficulty that Hart’s account faces is that the legal system 
heavily depends on individuals’ general acceptance of primary and secondary rules: 
                                                        
43 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 24. 
44 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 77-89. 
45 Ibid.  
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where that is not the case, corruption and disorder are experienced. The key 
question is: what makes people accept or reject social or legal rules? It is likely that 
their moral principles and convictions play a significant role in that respect. If that is 
right, it means that people’s attitudes have an indirect yet consequential effect on 
the validity of the laws of the land, and that poses a problem for Hart’s claim 
regarding the independence of morality from law.   
 We may stop and ask whether it is our moral convictions that make us accept 
or reject laws, or is it the laws of the land that shape our moral convictions in the 
first place? If the latter is the case, then Hart could be right in saying that law exists 
independently of morality. However, the existence of major and local opposition 
groups against important laws in any country - such as laws regarding the prevalent 
political setting of that country - seem to suggest otherwise. Bad Iranian laws 
regarding the education, leadership and religion in that country have raised 
discontent and widespread disagreement amongst a major portion of the new 
generation in Iran: a testament to the claim that prevailing laws do not always shape 
the morality of a population.46 In addition, it is people’s moral convictions about 
their rights and their preferred way of life that pushes them to ask for a change in 
the legal system and its functioning. So, there is little doubt that moral principles 
have an important influence on people’s acceptance or rejection of laws. Seeing that 
Hart defines law as the union of primary and secondary rules and, because the 
                                                        
46 Not much time has passed since the demonstrations that followed the rigged presidential elections 
of 2009 in Iran. Out of those those demonstrations was born what has come to be known as the 
“Green Movement”. The point to note is that the moral convictions of people of Iran did not change 
with the wishes of the oppressive regime of that country. See Slater Bakhtavar, Iran: The Green 
Movement (Irving: Parsa Enterprises, LLC, 2009).     
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proper functioning of this system requires an internal acceptance of its rules, and 
because that acceptance is affected by people’s moral convictions, Hart must 
concede that law is not independent of morality, but very much shaped and affected 
by it.  
  But could we make the transition from “law and morality are 
interdependent” to “morality should be an important factor in the formation and the 
rule of law”? It seems that unless such a transition is made in practice, unhappiness, 
disobedience and disorder will follow on the part of the people. At the same time, 
we certainly do not want moral claims to undermine the authority of law: that is to 
say, we cannot always accept moral reasoning as a justification for legal 
disobedience. That is why it is important to make a distinction between the role of 
morality in shaping the content of the laws and the moral obligation to obey the law. 
The latter must reign supreme in most cases for two reasons: 1) to avoid chaos and 
disorder within society and 2) because good laws already include a consideration of 
different moral convictions and in that sense the law is supposed to be considerate 
of while taking into account the moral convictions of the people.47 A good legal 
system includes legal ways in which disagreement with the law and moral concerns 
could be expressed and dealt with in an orderly and civil manner. Furthermore, in a 
healthy legal system morality has already been studied and considered in the 
making of the laws, which should reduce discontentment due to moral concerns. 
                                                        
47 How this kind of consideration is achieved is a separate question that shall be partly addressed in 
the chapters to come. 
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The question is: to what extent can legal positivism incorporate moral principles, if 
at all, and how?  
2.10 Scope and Determinacy of Legal Positivism 
 Those who acknowledge the role that moral principles play in law often 
disagree about how a balance between law and morality is achieved or how it 
should be achieved. But they do not only disagree amongst themselves, they also 
have to address the fundamental claims of skeptics who claim, for different reasons, 
that moral principles have no place in law.  
 The objection of skeptics is important but not irrefutable. There are two 
major forms of skepticism with respect to morality. One makes a metaphysical 
claim, saying that moral principles cannot be proven or seen in the way that 
hypotheses in physics could be tested and proven. The argument is that because we 
cannot test moral claims in the way that we can test scientific claims, moral 
principles remain uncertain and would constitute shaky grounds for our legal 
system. The same skeptics worry that the great variety of moral convictions that 
people hold would create pragmatic issues in the process of writing the law. Similar 
views that attack the metaphysical standing of moral principles fall under what 
Ronald Dworkin has labeled “external skepticism”48.  
External skepticism is sidestepped if we consider the central place that 
morality plays in our lives. For instance, contracting is a way of ensuring that 
individuals follow up on their promises, which is generally a moral obligation. We 
                                                        
48 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 79-80.  
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can easily think of many other laws that are justified by, or based on, some moral 
principle: laws against perjury and laws against sexual misconduct are only two in 
that category. We make important decisions in our lives based on the moral 
responsibilities that we have towards our family, friends and colleagues. In short, 
the importance and significance of the place of morality in our lives is undeniable. 
Therefore, even if we cannot prove the metaphysical place of morality in the 
universe, we can certainly realize its importance within the physical realm that we 
inhabit as humans. Moral claims, even if they are not “out there to be seen” are 
perceivable in other ways. As far as the testability of moral claims is concerned, the 
mere fact that moral claims are evaluated in a different way than scientific claims is 
no evidence against their credibility or legitimacy. Proponents of different moral 
theories have given convincing moral arguments to support their claims. 
The other form of skepticism is internal skepticism. Internal skeptics 
question the substance of moral principles. Simply put, they do not reject the place 
or importance of morality in the world; but they do worry about the subjective 
nature of moral claims. Subjectivity is worrisome because it is based on personal 
opinions. Personal opinions are problematic because they often rely on personal 
interests, they are often uneducated and, most importantly, there are an 
uncountable number of them within each society. Once again, skeptics worry that - 
without “concrete” proof - moral judgments remain like ice cream flavours: there is 
no way of proving which ice cream flavour is more delicious. In response to this, the 
defender of moral principles could say that our social practices and the role of 
morality in our lives impose certain meanings and consequences upon moral claims 
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and actions that follow from those claims that ice cream flavours do not have. For 
instance, the act of stealing has a consequence and meaning for people that ice 
cream flavours do not in ordinary circumstances. We do not find murder acceptable 
even if it helps the psychopath feel better to kill others; the same cannot be said of 
many other matters that some consider as merely subjective. Even though a full 
response to skepticism, in the context of law, would include an account of how we 
are to successfully manage and incorporate moral principles within our legal 
system; we can see now that moral principles, when qualified and defended, are not 
merely a matter of purely personal, subjective opinion.49 And that is important to 
point out because it gives moral claims a significant and credible voice when it 
comes to determining laws and principles. Moral claims are entrenched in the 
complex web of social phenomena and their correctness is defined and evaluated 
based on social dynamics that affect society as a whole. Simply put, we can argue 
against moral convictions but we cannot argue that someone is “wrong” in picking 
strawberry as their favourite flavour of ice cream. Thus, we could and we must 
sidestep internal skepticism when it comes to legal issues. If that argument is 
correct, another obstacle is removed from the way of legal positivists to allow the 




                                                        
49 A model for incorporation of moral principles in law will be sketched as this chapter, and the 
following ones, unfold.   
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2.11 Intentions of Legal Positivists  
While rejecting skepticism as an approach, we must not take its claims too 
lightly. There is a lesson to take away from the observation that moral claims are 
different from scientific ones or most other claims that we come across: we must 
remember that the proofs supporting moral principles will be more theoretical than 
empirical in nature. Meanwhile the empirical component of the reasoning that’s 
offered in support of moral principles will require a special kind of consideration. 
Moral evidence has to be considered alongside other, and often conflicting, evidence. 
The concern of skeptics may be a result of the fact that we are not quite settled on 
how properly to carry out such considerations. This observation brings us back to 
the question of how exactly should we incorporate moral principles in law? 
 One solution is found in John Dewey’s theory of democracy and law. He 
points out the direct connection that exists between democracy and law, suggesting 
that “an understanding of law can only follow from an accurate understanding of the 
social and political context within which it functions.”50 For Dewey, democracy is a 
way of life that is social before it is political: in other words, for there to be a real 
democratic state a certain culture needs to prevail in the society first. Similarly, to 
make laws within a democratic state, one needs to understand the cultural, social 
and political realities of that society. The relation between social phenomena, on the 
one hand, and the legal and political structure of a society, on the other, is a two-way 
relation in which all members react to one another while affecting each other. 
                                                        
50 Brian E. Butler, “Democracy and Law: Situating Law within John Dewey’s Democratic Vision,” Etica 
& Politica XII, no. 1 (2010): 256.  
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Therefore, the laws must demonstrate an understanding of social realities, which 
include the moral beliefs of the ordinary people. Ignoring such realities is, according 
to Dewey, a “betrayal of human freedom no matter in what guise it presents itself”51  
The solution for including moral values in our laws, inspired by Dewey’s 
account, is as follows: we need to allow for an understanding of moral realities of 
the society through multiple avenues that make possible the communication of 
information and set the grounds for discussion and inclusion of morality in law. For 
instance, attention to different groups that are formed upon a basis of shared 
interests will encourage the inclusion - or at least a consideration - of moral values 
that people hold; this approach stands in contrast to the top-down constitutional 
approach which leaves the task of law-making in the politicians’ hands alone. Such a 
system utilizes the expertise of professionals and the creative spirit of the people, 
which reflects a wide range of concerns and experiences to give rise to laws that 
match each society’s realities. Democracy and law reinforce one another in this 
model.  
 The realization of such a system is a project underway in countries like 
Canada: we already observe laws and lively discussions reflecting concerns about 
issues like “reasonable accommodation.” However, written laws can only address so 
many moral and social issues. That means that legal positivism, in its best form, 
needs supplementation to fully address the needs of a society. The foundation and 
                                                        
51 Brian E. Butler, “Democracy and Law: Situating Law within John Dewey’s Democratic Vision,” Etica 
& Politica XII, no. 1 (2010): 257. 
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structure of law call for another feature to compensate in cases where written laws 
fall short. Ronald Dworkin suggests interpretation as the saving feature in law. 
2.12 Dworkin and The Methodology of The Interpretivist View 
 Direct application of the black letter view has caused issues in the past and, 
without reform, it will continue to do so. Issues arise because written laws are often 
too broad or too narrow in nature to tailor to the specificity of the situations which 
arise in everyday civil cases: my case – as described in the introduction - is an 
example of that. There are no written laws that directly tell us what is to be done in 
a case where a company manipulates young students to sign a contract; even if there 
are laws regarding manipulation, forced consent, and so on.   
 Even a positivist like Hart admits that one of the reasons for the ambiguity 
that surrounds the notion of law is the existence of such cases, which he calls 
“borderline cases”: these are cases that fall outside of direct application of written 
laws.52 The role of the judge or the court in such cases, according to Hart, is to make 
new rules, based on discretion and precedent. But even in cases that do not qualify 
as borderline cases, a judge may choose to prioritize one rule over the other, leading 
the case towards one outcome over the other. It is not surprising that controversy 
surrounds the court decisions that we do hear about, breeding disagreement not 
only amongst ordinary people but especially amongst judges, lawyers, and law 
makers. In fact, ‘rule scepticism’ refers to the ability of the courts and judges to set 
                                                        
52 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 1-13. 
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new precedent and rules to point out that such a process could become boundless, 
nullifying law as an institution.  
 Added to the already complex nature of a court’s decision is the argument 
surrounding the nature of the disagreements that arise between professionals in 
law. The nature of this disagreement is important because it directly determines the 
way we manage matters in jurisdiction and legislation. The positivists are inclined 
to say that the uncertainty surrounding borderline cases is a result of the open 
texture nature of language. In other words, they believe the issue to be a semantic 
one. They claim that uncertainty in such cases is resolved by digging through 
written laws and staying as faithful as possible to the ‘black letter view’ of law. They 
thus claim that there is, or ought, not to be any real disagreement regarding how to 
decide a case. However, reality has proven otherwise: new claims regarding 
individual rights are often expressed in new and different ways, posing new 
semantic challenges for the courts and legislators. Moreover, societal progress and 
changes in people’s mentality often move quicker than the changes in our laws, 
creating new issues and genuine disagreement about how new cases are to be ruled. 
Similarly, natural law theorists would side with the positivists in claiming that law 
does set the grounds to settle any disagreement, one must only figure out under 
which natural law or duty each case falls. However, it is once again interpretation 
that ultimately decides the general direction of our legal system or particular cases, 
which makes it important to people to voice their opinion if they wish the balance of 
justice to reach equilibrium. In fact, the complexity of human circumstances and the 
mere fact that we need institutions such as the courthouse is evidence that 
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disagreement is real within jurisprudence. The real question to consider is: in what 
way are we to deal with this kind of disagreement? Seeing that the root of such 
disagreements is ideological in nature, interpretation of the laws and situations at 
hand seem to be the only way to resolve the issues.   
 The use of interpretation is further justified by the fact that it helps support 
two main goals of the legal system: 1) the preservation of order; and 2) the 
protection of rights, liberties and important values (henceforth referred to as 
protection of rights). The connection that exists between these two functions of law 
is obvious: often one is compromised at the expense of the other. Now, there are, 
undoubtedly, many other functions that law fulfills. Therefore, my choice of the two 
above-mentioned goals might need some defending. Firstly, the conflicting and 
general nature of these two goals makes it so that they require the support of an 
institution like law if they are to be realized mutually at all. Secondly and on more 
theoretical grounds, the conflicting and basic nature of these two goals brings out 
some fundamental and difficult legal questions that can only be resolved through 
interpretation. Without legal interpretation, we might have to give up order, or our 
rights, almost indefinitely. Let us now consider how interpretation is to be included 
in legal reasoning and legal verdicts. 
 The method that Dworkin suggests goes as follows: interpretation is broken 
down into three steps.53 The first step is the “preinterpretive stage,” which 
distinguishes the various elements that make up the content of a given law or 
                                                        
53 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 65-68. 
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situation. So, if we consider this thesis as an example, the first stage of 
interpretation would involve identifying its chapters. The second stage involves the 
identification of some general justification for the main elements that were pointed 
out at the first stage: this is called “the interpretive stage”. During this second stage, 
the interpreter seeks to give reasons or justifications for why the elements of the 
first stage were identified in the first place. In the case of my thesis, this stage would 
require giving justifications for the existence of each chapter of this thesis. I would 
have to explain why it was important or necessary to lay out the chapters as I have 
and not otherwise. The third and final stage involves reform that comes in the shape 
of adjustment of what the law or social practice in question really requires; this 
stage is necessary to ensure that the law or social practice in question actually 
serves the justification that was given in the second stage. Again, in the case of this 
thesis, this stage would require adding new and relevant information that are found 
through research to each chapter to keep its content true to its original purpose. 
Similarly, the final stage of interpretation – in the context of law - is basically about 
updating the law. Based on Dworkin’s method, the process of applying law or 
understanding any given social practice is the act of studying its roots and 
reconsidering the original reasons for its existence in light of the case or situation at 
hand.  
2.13 Scope and Determinacy of Interpretivism   
Two major objections are brought against Dworkin’s method. The first worry 
is about the limit of interpretation: one may worry that interpretation may become 
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boundless, taking us far from our original purposes. Put differently, the worry is: 
how are we to keep interpretation in line? What if good interpretations blind us to 
better interpretations that exist and are not yet presented to us?  Fortunately, there 
are limits to this interpretive account, which prevent it from running wild. The 
obligation of being consistent with precedent, as well as the professional obligations 
of the judges and courts, keep the general direction of the legal system in line. The 
recognition of phenomena such as ‘judicial activism’, which refers to a judicial ruling 
that is based on personal or political convictions rather than existing laws, is 
evidence of our society’s awareness of deviant instances and our general desire to 
oppose such cases. Moreover, the hierarchy that exists within the judicial system 
makes it possible for the decisions of lower courts to be revoked or overruled by 
those of higher courts. Nevertheless, it is not unheard of that the courts sometimes 
make odd decisions. In those cases, the issue is not found within the legal system but 
it is caused by ordinary people’s ignorance of the laws or their rights: we will 
discuss that issue in depth in the following chapters. However, as far as the creative 
element of the interpretive method suggested by Dworkin is concerned, history, the 
intellectual community, as well as the widely accepted - and critically discussed 
values of each society - act as limiting factors for the kind of interpretation that is 
accepted by each society.  
 The second objection to this interpretivist method is the following: what 
happens when bad laws apply to a given case? ‘Bad’ in this context means 
inadequate, or lacking insight. This is a serious problem for laws that are construed 
too broadly without being officially supported by more specific mandates. The 
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problem is, of course, that laws which are flawed in that way could lead to bad 
interpretations and wrong decisions. Luckily, or unfortunately, in such cases the 
burden of justice falls on the representation of the case. It is the job of the lawyers or 
people involved in the case to highlight the relevant points and the peculiarity of the 
case at hand so that legislators and the jurists can make and apply the laws in a just 
manner. I argue in later chapters that educating the population in matters of 
representation, their rights, and the existing laws is an integral part of assuring that 
we have a healthy legal system. A major part of the problem with bad laws, in this 
context, is a lack or problem of communication between the people and those 
responsible for making and enforcing the law. If our legislators are not hearing or 
understanding the issues that arise every day for the ordinary folk, that ignorance 
could contribute to decisions that later reflect negatively on the people. Of course, 
this could be the result of bad intentions and legislators could simply be closing 
their eyes to certain problems and concerns; however, what is unsettling is that 
inadequate laws are made even when the best intentions are at play amongst 
professionals in law. For instance, the banning of the operation of companies like 
the one I was working with would require a thorough exposition of the extent of the 
damage that the company is doing to so many students each year:  that would make 
a real and credible case only if a sufficient number of people spoke out about their 
experience.  
 In sum, the interpretivist method seems to give citizens a lot of room to 
maneuver within the legal system: much of how injustice is dealt with is left in their 
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hands as they choose whether or not to overlook or to take action against the denial 
of their rights.    
2.14 Intent of the Interpretivists  
 The interpretivist school has progressive and social aims. Their aim is 
progressive in the sense that the supporters of this view wish to implement the 
necessary reforms to the existing legal system. They have a social approach because 
they aim to protect and reinforce justice for all individuals in society. However, 
these goals are only achievable with the participation of an educated population.  
 Hopefully, by now it has become clear that moral principles do have some 
place in law, even if further work needs to be done to better understand and define 
their place in law.  I have hoped to show in this chapter, drawing on Dworkin, that 
written laws alone are lacking in power to do what is usually expected of them: i.e., 
to preserve order and protect our rights and privileges. At the same time, there is a 
direct relation between legal principles of each society and individual rights: an 
increase in awareness of this relation is the first step towards a proper 
incorporation of principles within law. Another goal of this section has been to show 
that, without ordinary people’s input and participation, legal decisions could go 
astray and the legal system could take directions that are undesirable for the 
general public, especially when interpretation is involved. The knowledge of the 
foundation and structure of the prevailing legal system and alternative ones is an 
imperative for contributing to any legal system and society because it determines 
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ordinary people’s place within their legal state by informing them about the ways in 
which they can contribute to achievement of justice and fairness.   
I remember going for coffee with a friend who was in his third year of law 
school, about two years ago, to discuss my case. After some explanation and 
exchange of opinions and, in response to my claim that justice ought to be on my 
side (since what the company had done was so wrong) he replied: “This is why the 
small claims courts are so clogged with unnecessary cases: people just wrongly 
assume that the law will be on their side.” I thought that was a strange claim at the 
time. Could we really expect people to have an intimate knowledge of the way the 
legal system works if no explicit efforts are made outside of law schools to educate 
them? And, without that kind of knowledge, could we really blame people for using 
the small claims court to defend what they feel has been wrongly taken from them 
while hoping for the best? His annoyance was unsubstantiated, I thought. And upon 
reflection, it has become clear that, to create the kind of democratic culture which 
Dewey has described and strived for, a thorough understanding of the notion of 
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                                                    Chapter Three 
The Content and Purpose of Law 
  
The previous chapter focused on the foundation and structure of law. This 
chapter focuses on the content and purpose of law. Conceptually speaking, it is 
wrong to separate these two chapters because the topic of each determines the 
content of the other. However, this separation is helpful in the present context; since 
it reveals another perspective through which we must see our legal system and 
another way in which we could make it serve us better - as a society and individuals. 
The aim of the present chapter is to explore the relation between the content and 
purpose of law; and the impact that a substantial knowledge (or misunderstanding) 
of this relation has on our everyday life. I take human rights as an instance of the 
content of law and I take preservation of order and protection of rights as the basic 
purpose of law. The presupposition is, indeed, that law has a purely functional 
purpose: it is useful and desirable only in so far as it serves its purpose.     
A point may raised about the usefulness or aptness of using human rights as 
an example of what constitutes the content of law, in this context. The worry may be 
that since human rights are already at the margins of application of law; and given 
that positive contribution to them requires a great deal of expertise and knowledge 
of the field of legal protection of human rights, not the mention the context within 
which these laws are being applied; it may be less than helpful to allow ordinary 
people to participate in the interpretation and discussion of such topics as human 
rights. In response, I would argue that the context-dependant and fast rate at which 
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the global community is moving provide all the more reason why experts in the field 
of human right need the input of the ordinary folk to perfect laws and policies that 
pertain to each society, in light of that society’s particular situation. As it will be 
argued later in this chapter, a theoretical understanding of such issues which is 
unaccompanied by a good grasp of the realities that ordinary citizens are living lacks 
insight. Later we’ll consider the input of a Dr. who spoke of his experience of having 
to perform passive euthanasia on patients and the gap that he saw between that 
experience and his own theoretical and highly advanced training as a Dr. Likewise, 
while professionals in the field of law surely share valuable insight on topics such as 
human rights which may be invisible to the rest of ordinary folks; they still need the 
interpretation of ordinary citizens on subjects such as human rights: namely, how 
ordinary people feel disrespected, discriminated against or denied justice because 
the system has failed to recognize many of their struggles, perhaps not due to any 
inherent fault of the system. However, this does go to show that action and 
interpretation from our citizens are required in trying to improve the fairness and 
efficiency of our legal system.  
The model I envision, and aim to justify, is the following: the purpose of law, 
and its content, are two separate entities sitting on the opposite sides of the balance 
of justice. What tips the balance to one side or the other is interpretation and the 
kind of reasoning behind that interpretation. I maintain that interpretation needs to 
come from both of the following parties: experts working within the government to 
form and implement laws and the ordinary people. Note that ordinary people could 
not provide their share of interpretation unless they have a basic knowledge of the 
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legal system of which they are a part. This is the point that has been emphasized 
since the beginning of this thesis and in this chapter, we shall see once again, how a 
basic knowledge of the relation between the content and purpose of law is required 
for citizens to participate in the central act of interpretation, within our legal 
system. Think of it in terms of the balance justice which was just described: the ideal 
situation would be one in which the content of law and its purpose are at the same 
level: representing the situation in which content of the law is serving the 
achievement of its purpose without either side of the balance overweighing or being 
pulled down by the other side. What follows should help make this abstract model 
more tangible.  
3.1 Related Issues 
  To situate our debate, it’s useful to consider some existing issues between 
the purpose of law and its content. Human rights have been much debated by 
different nations and people throughout history. Take gender equality as an 
example of a basic human right. A recent study on Global Gender Gap shows that, 
over the last six years, while 85% of countries have improved their gender equality 
ratios, for the rest of the world the situation is worsening: “The sixth annual World 
Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2011, shows a slight decline over the 
last year in gender equality rankings for New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka 
and the United Kingdom this year, while gains are made in Brazil, Ethiopia, Qatar, 
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Tanzania and Turkey.”54 The question is: why a decline? Slow improvement seems 
justifiable – a decline less so. While political as well as socio-economical issues and 
struggles within the government have certainly contributed to such a decline in 
some of these countries, civilians’ understanding of their rights has also - in my 
opinion - had an important effect on this phenomenon. The latter will be the focus of 
discussion, if only because it is a promising way through which change for the better 
can come about.   
 The global scene is not the only one that’s worrisome when it comes to 
human rights. There are many Canadian examples as well. In an article recently 
published in Embassy, the head of Amnesty International complained about 
Canadians’ positions (or lack thereof) on many important human rights issues, 
urging our government to take a stand in support of the international 
implementation of human rights. In his view, the issue of human rights must take a 
more prominent place within our voters’ criteria for assessing different political 
parties. And he has a point.55 The Canadian government’s stance towards China’s 
human rights record is an instance that shows the values of our government and the 
importance of considering them. The Harper government, which was very critical of 
China’s human rights record at the outset in 2006, has since become silent on that 
important issue, using the importance of strengthening trade relations with China as 
                                                        
54 Saadi Zahidi, “Global Gender Gap Report 2011,” World Economic Forum, accessed December 15th, 
2011, http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-gap. 
55 Avinash Gavai, “Canada ‘part of the problem’ when it comes to human rights: Amnesty,” Embassy, 
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an explanation for its passive standpoint.56 Harper has claimed that he has “raised 
these issues” during his latest visit, but human rights activists remain skeptical of 
this claim, pointing out that Harper has not discussed any details about human 
rights discussions with the Chinese government; instead he’s maintained that this 
subject was discussed in private conversations with the leaders of that country.57 
The government’s attitude towards human rights has great consequences for its 
people: if the Canadian government is turning the other cheek when it comes to 
human rights issues on the global scene, we may wonder about its true beliefs 
regarding issues of human rights here at home as well. China’s deplorable reaction 
to the current situation in Syria has still not moved the Canadian government to 
break its silence on China’s position regarding human rights. Thus, in this case we 
see a misuse, or overlooking, of important laws – such as those regarding human 
rights – in favour of economic growth. This is certainly an uncanny clash between 
the content and purpose of the law.   
 The issue of pay equity in Canada is another instance of an area that has 
needed change in the recent years.58 This is one of the cases in which the 
government has had to intervene to implement change by asking people to state 
their case about pay inequalities in the workplace. While lawyers, professors, and 
the politically active have stated their case for and against issues relating to pay 
                                                        
56 “Harper urged to talk human rights with China”, CBC News, Last updated December 1st, 2009, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/12/01/harper-china-visit.html  
57 “Harper’s China visit ends with panda pact”, CBC News, Last updated February 11th, 2012, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/02/11/harper-china-saturday.html    
58 Special thanks to Francis Ghanimé and Katt Mousavi for pointing out this issue in relation to the 
topic at hand.   
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equity, it is significant that the general public has been for the most part quiet or 
passive with regards to the issue. At first glance, it is surprising, if not strange, that 
the change has not come from the general public, seeing that they are the ones who 
are more immediately affected by problems of pay. I suspect that one reason for 
people’s passivity vis-à-vis this issue - and similar ones - is their misunderstanding 
of what their rights are, and more importantly their failure to appreciate the 
important changes that legality brings to what would otherwise be seen merely as a 
moral right (more on this distinction later). What is the source of, and reason, for 
this lack of proper understanding? I believe that a look into the former will reveal 
the latter.  
3.2 Misunderstanding Rights   
Those sensitive to the way in which language is used have surely noticed the 
inadequate use of the word right that is performed on a daily basis by many people. 
The word does have a complicated history – owing to different philosophical and 
legal meanings – and not everyone can be an expert on rights. But it’s important to 
point out some of the ways in which the word ‘right’ is misused since that can reveal 
the source of some problems that arise and, more importantly, because the wrong 
use of expressions like “legal rights” or “moral rights” has more than linguistically 
offensive consequences.  
As a society, we have an implicit understanding of a right as something that 
we’ve become accustomed to having or receiving. Spending a short amount of time 
at a daycare centre will reveal that same kind of attitude in our children: kids will 
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act out if their favorite toy is not there to play with, or occasionally if they’re asked 
to share. Similarly, a child may understand it to be ‘his right’ to go to the park on 
Wednesday afternoons, since he’s been accustomed to going to the park every week 
at that time, for some time now. But most of us would be hesitant to accept that the 
child actually has a right to demand an outing to the park every single week. And any 
reasonable parent would, as they should, somehow clarify that going to the park 
every week is a privilege and not a right to be taken for granted. This much is 
obvious. Yet North American culture displays many instances of the childish “right-
to-go-to-park-every-week.” It’s not always realized what kind of important and 
serious damage is brought about by this incorrect usage and understanding of what 
a right is: if, as a people, we call being served with extra care at a restaurant a 
“customer’s right”, or other trivial instances like that; it is no surprise that our legal 
system has become somewhat insensitive to the general use of the word. In fact, 
there is a general sense - displayed by this widespread yet questionable use of the 
word ‘right’ - that we all know what a ‘right’ is and need not reflect on it. It’s little 
surprise that political debates surrounding actual rights are fuelled by 
controversies. Our vulnerable understanding of rights provides an opportunity for 
the state, media or any other group to sway our opinion and manipulate our views. 
Yet, the ambiguity surrounding the word ‘right’ is constantly overlooked in ordinary 
circumstances. In an attempt to remedy this situation, it’s important for us to have a 
deeper discussion of what rights are and how they relate to a number of other 
concepts such as: obligations, privileges, and expectations, each of which often get 
confused with rights.   
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A brief overview of W.N. Hohfeld’s account of rights highlights two points: 
the complexity of the notion of rights; and their potential in bringing about change 
or reform. Hohfeld’s work presents an analytic classification of rights into different 
categories that establish various kinds of relationships between individuals and 
other parties. According to his view, rights could refer to any or some of the 
following categories: “claim-rights, liberties, powers and immunities”59 Claim-rights 
basically define a claim that someone holds against others: for instance, if I owe 
someone money, that person has a claim against me to receive that money. A liberty, 
in the context of rights, is having the freedom to do or not do something. If an 
elderly family member asks me to be the legal executer of her wishes after she 
passes, I have the liberty to accept or decline her request because, as dear as she 
may be to me, she holds no legal claim against me to accept her request. Having a 
power to do something is self-explanatory in principle, but it is distinct from having 
a liberty: for instance, a manager may have the liberty to hire new employees every 
day but his power to hire new employees may be limited by, amongst other things, 
financial concerns for his company. Immunities in a way ensure that the 
government does not overpower individuals by setting certain limits. For example, if 
individuals have an immunity X against the government, there is nothing the 
government can do to change individuals’ legal position with regards to X or any 
entitlement that is covered under X. ‘Diplomatic immunity’ is another instance of a 
legal immunity ensuring diplomats’ safe passage through foreign countries: during 
their visit to other countries, diplomats are not susceptible to lawsuit or prosecution 
                                                        
59 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and 
Other Essays, ed. Walter Wheeler Cook (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), Chapter I.  
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under the host country’s laws (although they may be expelled). Ownership of 
private property gives property owners an immunity against other individuals to 
take away or make any legal claims about their property: correlatively, others have 
an inability to make any legal claims on one’s private property.60  
The definition of rights in relational terms is a distinguishing characteristic of 
Hohfeld’s account and a point that deserves emphasizing. Enforcement and 
protection of rights could be tricky because different categories of rights overlap 
and make conflicting demands in many cases, which makes the relationship between 
right-holders and other individuals a complex one. But the relational character of 
rights also provides an opportunity for change, as mentioned earlier: expectations 
could be recognized as rights through the due process, or some privileges can come 
to be enforced just like rights. However, all these require action from the people, the 
kind of action that wouldn’t be successful without a correct understanding of rights. 
For instance, failing to distinguish the difference between a liberty and a power 
could cause problems in the ways in which people choose to go about making 
change. This conception of rights gets us far away from the simplistic understanding 
of rights as a guarantee that we’ll continue to receive certain goods or services.  
Let’s explore the complexity of rights in more depth. Hohfeld points out: 
“Claim-rights, liberties, powers and immunities are distinguished by what they 
imply about the legal position of the other party.”61 Thus, when an individual claims 
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Other Essays, ed. Walter Wheeler Cook (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), Chapter I. 
61 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and 
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to have a right, they’re referring to a series of actions that are permissible or 
impermissible for them as well as others. But we have to remember that, in practice, 
the bulk of their claim hinges on which actions they believe to be permissible and 
which impermissible; which is why it’s so important to have a correct 
understanding of what each right entails and also what different people and 
institutions could mean by that claim. The latter necessarily requires an internal 
perspective in addition to a basic theoretical understanding of rights. But even when 
intentions and political agendas of people or institutions are pure, complications 
come up. Consider this: each category of rights creates a relationship between the 
right-holder, i.e. the person enjoying the privileges that the right provides and 
protects, and the people who need to take action (or refrain from some action) for 
that right to be fulfilled. Suppose that that relationship is clear and simple. 
Complications may arise at an individual level: many rights create conflicting duties 
for the same person. For instance, as a part of a company one may have the legal 
obligation, as articulated in their agreement contract, to not disclose certain 
information to competitors and yet, as a person entering into a business 
relationship with others, one may have the legal and moral obligation to be honest 
and provide that same information to certain others, say customers… who may well 
then disclose it to the competition. Which rights supersede which other rights? And 
what are we to do in these cases of conflict?  
How people act in these, and other similar, situations of conflict largely 
depends on their understanding and beliefs about their rights. We can imagine the 
reaction of an employee who disregards their moral intuition or obligation lest they 
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would suffer legal consequences. Or conversely, we can imagine people who show 
blatant disrespect for a given law, or a particular manifestation of it, based on their 
moral convictions. It’ll become clear in what follows that people will benefit from, or 
be disadvantaged by, law to the extent that they understand and put to practice the 
distinction between moral and legal rights: that, in turn, determines how much 
fairness and legal efficiency is seen in a given legal system.    
In a nutshell, moral rights are rights that are held and accepted by most 
people in a society without necessarily having been written into laws whereas legal 
rights are derived from legislation. But there are important qualifications for that 
claim: for instance, many laws are formulated vaguely (as we saw before), which 
means that the same laws could enforce different rights or mean different things in 
various contexts: interpretation becomes key in those instances. Conversely, some 
moral rights could be defended and supported against some written laws. For 
example, the laws that support freedom of speech take different forms in various 
situations, as we’ve already discussed: in our education system, citizens’ moral right 
of receiving a good education could form the grounds for them to fight certain 
content that they may consider inappropriate for their children. In other words, the 
moral right of receiving a good education gives parents the moral right to express 
their discontent with certain pedagogies. Yet, in other cases, the same laws of 
freedom of speech allow instructors to approach topics in a way that is controversial 
and beneficial, even if their approach is frowned upon by some members of the 
community. Thus, in practice, the line that separates the two kinds of rights is 
blurry, which could be good or bad for the general public depending on the level of 
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their understanding of each situation and the actions that they’re willing to take to 
defend a right. My belief is that legal ignorance in such conflicted cases results in 
much disadvantage for people whereas a basic understanding of the nature of the 
conflict could allow them to gain a lot. An example should clarify this claim.  
Let’s reflect on the difference between the obligation for women to wear the 
hijab in a mosque and the citizens’ obligation to not litter the street. Besides the 
monetary sanctions that ought to follow littering, what exactly distinguishes these 
two kinds of obligations? The first, of course, is an instance of a moral obligation: 
there are no written laws against going to a mosque without the hijab in countries 
like Canada. However, there is an expectation on the part of the community of 
mosque-goers that women entering the mosque will wear the hijab out of respect 
for the religion. But what distinguishes that from a society’s desire not to have litter 
on the streets? The pragmatic individual will be quick to remind us of the 
environmental and health-related reasons why it is imperative for us to make sure 
that littering does not become an epidemic habit of people. The same individual 
would perhaps argue that many moral obligations, such as refraining from going to 
mosque without the hijab, do not have such concrete or harmful consequences and 
for that reason it is not as urgent or important to turn such obligations into laws in 
all cases. But, realistically, how seriously is the law against littering enforced? In 
terms of people’s attitude, is the law against littering taken any more seriously than 
the custom of going to mosque “dressed modestly,” as some would put it? It seems 
that forgoing both obligations would solicit some frowns in most cases. Thus, the 
formal enforcement of a law, and the informal policy at a mosque, are put on almost 
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equal grounds in terms of realization. In its simplicity, this example displays the 
similarity and fine line that exists between some laws and other customs, and in 
turn the kind of rights that they create. This is not surprising since laws are a 
reflection of the beliefs and desires of a society as a whole, at least in a democracy. 
And in fact, the beauty of living in a free and democratic society is that, if we woke 
up tomorrow morning to a city full of garbage and people who continued littering 
ferociously, we could and probably would demand that the law against littering be 
more seriously enforced. But what if the members of the mosque wanted the 
wearing of the hijab inside the mosque to become a law? The process would be 
longer and require more effort but it would certainly not be hopeless from the 
outset. Similarly, knowing the difference between a moral right and a legal right and 
what can be demanded from society in each situation - could benefit people in great 
ways.    
A real and contemporary Canadian example of evolution and changes 
implanted to protect individual rights concerns pay equity in Canada. This is an 
instance in which both the government and the people have had to take steps to 
enforce women’s, and minorities’, rights to have equal pay as men or other groups 
for the same kind of work. However, pay issues are not totally fixed yet. According 
to a report published by the Canadian Labour Congress in May 2010: “Only Ontario 
and Quebec have proactive pay equity laws which cover both the public and private 
sector. Other provinces enacted pay equity legislation that covered only the public 
sector and didn't require pay equity to be maintained. Still other jurisdictions, 
including federal law, have provisions in their human rights laws, which depend on 
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an individual filing an official complaint against her employer.”62 The same report 
emphasizes the advantages of proactive legislation when it comes to issues such as 
pay equity. Proactive legislation requires the participation and voiced desire of the 
people for change. As the report states, legislation is a method that presents a more 
comprehensive way of dealing with such issues, while showing the systematic 
problems that exist and, at the same time, combining legislative direction, collective 
bargaining, and enforcement - with the option of neutral adjudication of any dispute. 
The government has thus encouraged the general population to come forth and 
report pay equity issues that they have witnessed or experienced: this step is an 
important one in fixing the problem of pay equity because it helps the government 
take faster and more directed action against employers who are neglecting the laws 
about pay equity. We can imagine that, without the right kind of education and 
knowledge, the majority of the population would not come forth with valuable 
information that would serve as the basis of solutions to these problems, especially 
if, as is often the case, they were dependent on their current jobs for their survival. 
Increasing education about this topic, specialized mediation assistance, and 
compliance monitoring are some steps that the government can take to remedy the 
situation. 
We have seen some important ways in which knowledge - or lack thereof - 
about our rights could make opportunities for legal improvement or persistence of 
injustice. But is it enough to realize that, as individuals, we must take steps in 
                                                        
62 “A Quick Education in Pay Equity – Women’s Economic Equality,” Canadian Labour Congress, Last 
updated May 17th, 2010, http://www.canadianlabour.ca/news-room/publications/quick-education-
pay-equity-womens-economic-equality.  
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reinforcing and defending our rights, even under a generally benevolent 
government such as that of Canada? In my opinion, it is not. Understanding that 
protection of rights – or fulfilling law’s purpose - is a process that requires action 
from ordinary people as well as the government is the first step towards achieving a 
more just society. A more substantial understanding of the content of the law and its 
purpose is needed to provide direction for people’s efforts in bringing about change. 
A correct understanding of the concept of rights and their role in the legal scene is a 
suitable place to start.   
3.3 What are rights? 
 To exist and serve their purpose, rights need constant reinforcement. In that 
sense, they are very much like values that need to be taught and practiced to remain 
true and valid. But that reinforcement can only be carried out properly if 
governments and their people both have a theoretical understanding of rights and 
realize the practical implications of those rights for themselves and others. Such 
understanding need not, and does not, imply the knowledge of a full list of human 
rights; but it does require a basic legal literacy and understanding of the language of 
rights.  Moreover, because the theoretical and practical consequences of rights and 
their understanding are so closely related, the most effective way of ensuring 
efficiency and fairness in this context is to equip ordinary people with the 
knowledge that would help them navigate the maze of rights. If people have the 
necessary knowledge of rights, much legal trouble could be prevented, as people 
would not make preventable mistakes; this, in turn, would allow our legal resources 
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to be focused on less avoidable issues. Without this knowledge, people’s interaction 
with law would in many cases be a matter of trial and error.  
Brian Orend provides an interesting account of what rights are in his book 
Human Rights: Concept and Context. He defines a right as “a high-priority 
entitlement, justified by sufficient reasons, to something one claims as one’s due”63 
The two points that I’d like to focus on, in Orend’s account of rights, are: a) the 
element of justification that is necessary for something to be recognized as a right; 
and b) the notion of entitlement. Orend argues that rights are reasons, not 
properties: we do not own or possess a right in the same way that we own a pair of 
jeans. Neither do we have rights like we have arms, legs or souls (as was Locke’s 
view); rights can be forfeited, limited, or lost as a result of our own actions and 
behaviour. As Orend maintains, to claim something as a right, we must have good 
and sufficient reasons for doing so. Of course, what constitutes sufficient reasons is 
controversial and dependent on the context that presents itself. But the important 
point to take from Orend’s view is that reasons are at the basis of human rights. The 
second point to focus on is the notion of entitlement: Orend reminds us that rights 
are not to be taken for granted. They can be, and often are, forfeited for different 
reasons. This brings us back to the idea of relationships that are created between 
right-holders and others through rights. Consider this: someone who’s been known 
to cheat an established and respected system repeatedly forfeits the right to be 
recognized as a member of that system, or at least a member whose view should 
count in any significant way or be benefited in the same way as others by that 
                                                        
63 Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Broadview Press, 2002), 24. 
 
  84 
institution. Similarly, murderers forfeit the right to freely roam around in society 
once they’ve been convicted. At the basis of both of these examples is found the 
principle of reasons: the rights that we do enjoy are a result of good reasons; and the 
rights that we forfeit are a consequence, backed by reasons, of our actions or failure 
to act. By default every human being is entitled to basic human rights: it is only 
when an individual or government begins abusing those rights and infringing upon 
the rights of others that they begin to forfeit some of their rights.  
 The idea of rights as entitlements is clear and it makes good sense in the 
context of the Hohfeldian web of relationships that create obligations and duties, 
which then shape our rights. Pairing that notion with the idea that rights are 
reasons, the pressing question becomes: “what constitutes a good reason to serve as 
the basis of a right?” After all, to justify a right we need good reasons, not just any 
reasons at all. The answer to that question comes from two sources. First, 
potentially valid reasons for rights are determined by the desires of the people in a 
free and democratic society. The desire of French Canadians to preserve their 
language was and remains a reason for them to ask for laws that protect their 
culture and language. So, the legal rights relating to the French language in Quebec 
are based, at least partly, on the reasons that emanate from the people. The second 
source of good reasons that serve as the basis of rights is our conceptions of the 
purpose of rights and law more generally. What is thought to be the function of law 
greatly affects the way in which legislators decide legal issues; it is no surprise that 
they use the same kind of considerations in establishing legal right. It is therefore 
important to consider what’s been thought to be the purpose of rights, in 
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establishing the reasons for their existence. There have been two major theories 
about rights’ raison d’être. I’ll argue that they both have a good point but must be 
taken in conjunction to form a complete conception of the function of rights.  
“The will theory” and “the interest theory” of rights are the two theories to 
which I am referring. Traditionally, each of these theories has articulated a different 
conception of the purpose of rights. Whereas the interest theory conceives the 
primary and necessary goal of rights as the protection of people’s interests; the will 
theory submits that rights are there to give the right-holder authority and control 
over others. In my view, while these theories raise good questions and points about 
rights, separately they do not form a complete and satisfying account of rights in 
terms of their function. For instance, it is imperative for us to consider who should 
hold the ultimate authority in a situation where some people’s rights are denied and 
others’ rights are conflicting. But it is equally true that, conceptually speaking, the 
whole discussion of human rights seems at best trivial were it not because those 
rights are there to help people’s basic interests. Thus, the exclusion of either of the 
two theories may indicate ulterior motives, that is motives other than the 
amelioration and protection of rights.  
 Recent work on both theories seems to agree with that view. In a recent 
article titled Debate: Taking Human Rights Seriously, Christopher H. Wellman argues 
for external states’ intervention in another sovereign state’s affairs if that means 
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preventing just one human rights violation.64 Compared to the traditional 
conceptions of the will theory of rights, this view may seem strange at first 
especially coming from a supposed proponent of that theory. Traditionally, the will 
theory of rights has conceived rights as what give authority to right-holders, be it 
individuals or states, to put duties on others, such as the duty not to interfere in 
their affairs. However, in Wellman’s account, justified interference “mirrors the best 
analysis of our duty to obey the law, while also cohering nicely with our considered 
convictions regarding other functionally-justified rights like parental dominion over 
one’s children.”65 The reasons why Wellman views similar interventions as justified 
are negligible for our purposes; instead, what I’d like to highlight is the position of 
some supporters of the will theory on the topic of the kind of authority that this 
theory bestows on right-holders. It is a mistake to view or use the will theory as 
giving absolute rights to any individual or states. Will theory, seen in this light, is 
completely congruent with the idea of rights as what can be forfeited. Also 
noteworthy is the context in which some overstepping of others’ authority is seen as 
permissible by will theorists like Wellman: cases where authority is used to 
undermine the authority that everyone, in principle, is supposed to enjoy - for 
example, right to basic liberties and freedoms. 
 Joseph Raz, a supporter of the interest theory of rights, effectively holds the 
same position on the topic of states’ interference in other states’ affairs in times of 
need, which could in my opinion be extrapolated to individuals’ rights and their 
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position vis-à-vis injustice done towards others’ rights. In an article titled “Human 
Rights Without Foundations,” Raz reiterates the reason for human rights as serving 
the good of the people. He worries that claims to universality or the importance of 
human rights have been associated with apparently indefeasible accounts that in 
practice obstruct those very rights. In his view, “there is not enough discipline 
underpinning the use of the term ‘human rights’ to make it a useful analytical 
tool.”66 For that reason, Raz considers it crucial to focus on setting the correct state-
transcending standards for ensuring that people’s rights are respected; we ought 
not to allow complacency about the nature and importance of human rights to 
overshadow their function or become a reason for just anyone to interfere with 
others’ rights. In other words, the blind acceptance of universality or importance of 
human rights could lead to political and social problems for the people in any given 
society.  
This is where the idea of interpretation becomes most obviously relevant. 
Without interpretation, the balance of justice could not achieve equilibrium: states 
could manipulate and abuse people’s lack of legal knowledge for their own benefit 
by distorting the purpose of law in various ways and using that to change its 
content. Meanwhile, basic abilities to see and interpret legal change and information 
for what they are would allow people to hold the balance of justice in check. For 
instance, by demanding changes in the content of law, citizens could ensure that 
prosaic accounts about the purpose or content of law do not rob them of what is 
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rightly theirs. Thus, both governments and their citizens have a role and a 
contribution to make before the balance of justice could even approach the state of 
equilibrium. In other words, interpretation of legal ideas is the venue through which 
people and governments contribute to the overall legal well-being of a society. Too 
much interpretation from one side - or one group of people – risks tilting the 
balance to one side over the other, depending on the intentions and goals of that 
group. Of course, making good use of interpretation in this context, like any other, 
requires a proper understanding of interpretation and a suitable approach to it. The 
field of legal hermeneutics has actually gotten significant attention in recent years.67 
The next section presents an overview of some basic issues on the topic and how 
they affect our approach to legal interpretation. In short, the understanding of the 
content of law, such as our rights, remains unhelpful in many ways unless it is 
paired with an understanding of how that content is formed and how it can be made 
better.  
3.4 Interpretation and The Balance of Justice  
 We return once again to the work of Ronald Dworkin: his analysis of 
interpretation and the role it plays within legal theory and practice provide valuable 
insight into why an understanding of the concept of interpretation is so crucial to 
anyone who wishes to make a contribution to the balance of justice. My view is that 
the role played by ordinary people has yet to get sufficient attention when it comes 
to the ways in which interpretation shapes and changes a legal system. I shall 
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defend the view that both the constructive model of interpretation and the author’s 
intent model of interpretation - as presented by Dworkin - play a necessary role in 
our legal understanding. This view will be defended against an objection posed by 
Jeremy Waldron who sees any appeal to the “intent of the author” as futile in today’s 
democratic society. My aim in presenting these ideas is to show how the structure of 
interpretation and an understanding of it help citizens’ contribution to the balance 
of justice.  
According to Dworkin: “roughly, constructive interpretation is a matter of 
imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible 
example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”68 He goes on to point 
out that this does not mean that constructive interpretation could become 
boundless because “the history or shape of a practice or object constrains the 
available interpretation of it, though that constraint needs careful accounting…”69 
Constructive interpretation is distinguished from creative interpretation, which is 
concerned with the relationship between purpose and the object. At first glance, this 
view of interpretation can seem intimidating; not so implicit in Dworkin’s 
description of constructive interpretation is the idea that we need some level 
expertise to interpret any topic constructively. In fact, expertise seems to be a 
requirement to make something “the best possible example of the form or genre to 
which it is taken to belong.” Applied to legal matters, the subject can seem 
untouchable to the ordinary citizen: that law is written in a kind of language that is 
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not fully comprehensible to most citizens is undeniable. However, I will argue that 
the expertise requirement suggested by Dworkin’s account of constructive 
interpretation does not pose a fatal problem for citizens’ participation in the 
shaping of their legal system. But first, we must consider other views of 
interpretation as they apply to legal matters. 
Another account of interpretation, explained by Dworkin, is the “author’s 
intent model”. According to this view, to interpret an object properly we must 
appeal to the intentions of the maker of that object. For instance, to interpret a given 
statute we’d have to consider the intentions and purposes of the people who drafted 
that statute.70 Dworkin makes a very important distinction between interpreting a 
social practice (or, we can say, any established law) and understanding the members 
who participate in that social practice.71 He does submit that appeals to the intent of 
the author as well as creative interpretation (even though they may vary in quality), 
do fall under constructive interpretation. 
Already, we can see how different understandings of the act of interpretation 
alone can affect people’s approach to legal matters. While these accounts could be 
seen as obstacles in the way of popular participation in the formation of laws; the 
matter could be seen in a completely different light. For instance, I submit that the 
kind of expertise that the constructive account of interpretation requires is 
unachievable without people’s input into legal matters; similarly, even though the 
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realization of legislators’ intention in writing the laws may seem difficult or 
impossible at first, information which gives strong clues about those intentions is 
not too difficult to reach in a free and democratic country like Canada. Governments 
often explicitly state their aims in crafting legislation. If these claims are true, it is 
not only helpful but also necessary for the people of any given society to participate 
in legal matters and thereby contribute to the achievement of justice. But first these 
claims have to be substantiated.  
In order to show the veracity of my first claim, about the essential character 
of people’s contribution to the expertise that is needed for constructive 
interpretation, I take a controversial yet important case: an argument concerning 
the legality of active euthanasia. I believe that, in this case, like so many other social, 
political or medical cases, the insight of the individuals most directly involved with 
the topic that is being decided is crucial for making good laws or changing previous 
ones. Their input is necessary - although not sufficient - for achieving the expertise 
that constructive interpretation requires: it is obvious that the knowledge of 
lawmakers and their somewhat detached perspective is another essential part that 
precedes good laws. In an article discussing euthanasia, James Rachels aims to 
defend active euthanasia as a legal act, amongst other things, by appealing to a 
doctor’s view on the topic. He quotes one thusly: “As a surgeon whose natural 
inclination is to use the scalpel to fight off death, standing by and watching a 
salvageable baby die is the most emotionally exhausting experience I know. It is 
easy at a conference, in a theoretical discussion to decide that such infants should be 
allowed to die. It is altogether different to stand by in the nursery and watch as 
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dehydration and infection wither a tiny being over hours and days.”72 I want to 
emphasize the discrepancy that exists between theoretical discussions and the 
actual experience of carrying out passive euthanasia, as experienced and described 
by this doctor, to point out the relevance and importance of including facts of 
experience in deciding laws. The statement adopted by the House of Delegates of the 
American Medical Association sees the “intentional termination of the life of one 
human being by another – mercy killing – [as] contrary to that for which the medical 
profession stands and contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association.”73 
However, to many the experience of the doctor forms strong reasons showing that 
mercy killing in some cases may be the most humane action – and consequently 
should be in accord with policies of the American Medical Association. In fact, this 
kind of insight is part and parcel of the expertise that is put to test in constructive 
interpretation. Thus, the old distinction between the internal and external 
perspective - as pointed out by Hart - becomes relevant once again. Legislators, as 
other citizens in a society, cannot achieve full understanding of law, and how it must 
be shaped, without having a basic knowledge about the real applications of different 
rules and their consequences upon people. In other words, left to their own devices, 
any assembly of legislators is unlikely to achieve optimal fairness in forming laws 
without both: a) the insight of the experts in each field; and b) insight of people most 
affected by the topic. Just like legislators cannot be experts without the relevant and 
sufficient amount of insight into the internal perspective, ordinary citizens cannot 
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fully understand the law and its commands without an appreciation of the external 
perspective that legislators’ exposure and qualified view can offer. The full picture is 
needed.  
The second point to address is the issue of the accessibility of lawmakers’ 
intentions. Could we really discern the intentions of individuals in charge of 
approving or rejecting drafts of statutes?74 I believe that we can, in a meaningful 
way, although some research will be required. In my case, for instance, 
conversations with a few lawyers helped build a decent picture of which laws 
potentially applied to my case and why. It was through the knowledge of the laws 
against misrepresentation and deceitful business conduct that I was able to situate 
my particular case within so many other laws that could be relevant to my case; and 
that would not have been possible without bringing into play the intentions behind 
the laws, and by extension those of the minds who wrote them. In his book titled 
Interpretation and Legal Theory, Andrei Marmor argues for the necessity of 
deference to the intentions of lawmakers, especially in the case of vague statutes. He 
justifies his claim with the help of Joseph Raz’ theory of authority of law: if X is the 
legislator and has some kind of expertise, and in the case that X’s expertise and 
position constitutes the authority of law; citizens must appeal to X’s legislative 
intent in determining what they ought to do.75 The bottom line is: it’s important to 
go beyond the legal text or its portrayal by any one institution or group of 
individuals to discover its real meaning and aim; and doing so requires seeking out 
                                                        
74 Intention, in this context, refers to the reasons motivating assemblies or other legal bodies to 
accept or reject a given draft for statutes.  
75 Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and legal theory (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005), 
Chapter III. 
 
  94 
the intentions of those who approved those laws. I believe that this procedure could, 
and ought to, be more widely implemented in our society; and I shall suggest one 
way in which we could work towards that. But before that, it’s important to address 
Jeremy Waldron’s skepticism towards the intentionalist approach of Marmor.  
 Waldron rightly points out that, in modern society, laws are made by multi-
member assemblies who hold authority; it is therefore impractical if not impossible 
to appeal to the intentions of the lawmakers. He states: “The modern situation…is 
not that of a person’s having authority, but (at most) of a group’s having authority, 
and of its having that authority only in virtue of the way in which it combines the 
interests and knowledge of its members in the act of legislation.”76 However, the 
multi-faceted character of modern legislation could be seen as a reason for a clear 
and explicit account of the reasons behind each statute or law. More diversity in a 
society calls for increased awareness about different cultures, views and other 
points that may support any given law. It is no reason for stopping conversation, or 
the request about the reasons behind origins of statutes.  In the age of fast 
communication, and in a society that supports freedom of thought and expression, it 
is not difficult to seek out those reasons and the intentions of those who support 
those reasons. Therefore, it can’t be correct that appeals to the intentionalist view 
are futile in today’s society.   
We have now seen some views of interpretation. Two points are worth 
highlighting: first, interpretation requires an active role from the people; and 
                                                        
76 Jeremy Waldron, “Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation,” in Law and Interpretation: 
Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. Andrei Marmor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 331. 
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second, there are more ways than one to participate in interpretation (especially in 
a legal context) – which, if true, reduces the number of excuses that any citizen could 
have for failing to contribute to legal justice within their society. We saw that 
constructive interpretation, which includes forms of creative interpretation and the 
intent of the author model, offers different venues through which different voices 
could be heard. Needless to say, many if not all the interpretive steps described 
above are already being taken in our society by governmental bodies to some extent. 
The idea here is that increased awareness amongst the general public will further 
solidify these steps while helping the enforcement of justice. 
 Some may think that it’s simply not feasible to implement widely such a 
critical outlook for a majority of people. However, the task may be less complicated 
than we think. For instance, the implementation of the interpretive attitude that 
Dworkin refers to is a solid first step towards achieving a more engaged society. 
Dworkin claims that the interpretive attitude is supported by two assumptions, 
which I believe should be more actively promoted through our education system: 
“The first assumption is that [any] practice…does not simply exist but has value, that 
it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle...the second is the 
further assumption that the requirements of [the practice] are not necessarily or 
exclusively what they have always been taken to be but are instead sensitive to its 
point.”77 The second assumption is even more important and worthy of emphasis 
than the first because it points to the stable yet malleable nature of certain laws and 
                                                        
77 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 47.  
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statutes. While this interpretive attitude is more or less engendered by various 
attempts to teach critical thinking in our schools; it could and should be taught more 
explicitly in relation to law and legal matters at early stages of education. The human 
instinct to protect what belongs to us naturally inspires the desire to be treated 
fairly; the interpretative attitude shows people a way to ensure our laws serve that 
instinct. Other considerations such as the political structure of the society in which 
we live, covered in the next chapter, provide more reasons for promoting and 
internalizing the interpretive attitude. 
 In fact as we’ve seen in this chapter interpretation runs through all three 
legal theories that were discussed, albeit in different ways. Natural law theory 
involved an interpretation of what is considered to be the source of law. Legal 
positivism also required interpretation of the ‘black letter view’ despite the fact that 
many proponents of legal positivism would reject the role of interpretation within 
legal positivism; we saw that the mere fact that legal positivism relies on people’s 
acceptance of laws goes to show that interpretation, i.e. people’s interpretation in 
the form of their beliefs and acceptance of laws, is indeed an integral part of legal 
positivism. Finally, interpretivism entirely focused on the crucial role of 
interpretation in law. The recognition of the central role of interpretation in law is 
vital in making changes within our legal system because interpretation presents 
many opportunities for the people to assume an active role vis-à-vis legal matters, 
as interpretation allows them to challenge, point out and bring under officials’ 
attention different understandings of law. 
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Chapter Four 
People’s Role Within a Legal State 
 
  The functionality of the interpretive approach, as described in the previous 
chapter, is highly dependent on ordinary people’s knowledge and recognition of 
their place within a legal state, a place that determines their role in society. 
Highlighting people’s role and place within a political system reveals yet another 
reason why legal knowledge is so crucial for a healthy legal system, and that’s what 
we’ll consider in this chapter. 
I strongly believe that legal matters are often made out to be more 
complicated and less hopeful for the general public than they really are. To correct 
that misconception - and in order to help more people reap the benefits of living 
under a legal state - we must reinstate and emphasize the underlying principles of 
our political system, as laid out by so many great thinkers in the past, while 
redefining those principles as they apply to today’s society; that would then serve as 
a reminder of the role and place that ordinary citizens have in the modern world. 
Put simply, a merely historical and normative approach to this topic will not suffice 
in achieving a better and fairer legal state. The actual state of our government needs 
to be our starting point since it determines where we could hope to go from and, 
most importantly, what is the best way to get there.  
 My general aim is to highlight the power that ordinary citizens hold with 
regards to legal matters in a political democracy, by going back to the very basis of 
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our political system. An overview of some basic political principles that hold any 
society together gives us more reasons as to why we should be active in legal 
matters. The key is to understand, as a people, the dynamics of the legal-political 
system of which we are a part, and the best way to ensure that happens is through 
education. In the closing section of this chapter I will propose some changes to be 
applied to our social education to facilitate a better understanding of law amongst 
ordinary citizens, which would, in turn, improve their encounters with the law while 
preventing many legal issues from arising in the first place. 
4.1 How People’s Knowledge of Basic Principles Benefits a Legal State    
At one time or the other, we’ve all consciously felt the constraint that law 
places upon us: having to obey traffic laws, having to pay taxes or having one’s 
parental rights challenged are just a few examples of such instances. These 
constraints sometimes lead to feelings of frustration and helplessness. But, how are 
legitimate concerns about law, and how our society is run, distinguished from 
impatient complaints?  
In the opening lines of The Social Contract, Rousseau states, referring to the 
social man: “One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater 
slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it 
legitimate? That question I think I can answer.”78 Therein lies what justifies some of 
the frustrations that I was referring to earlier and more importantly their origin: if 
we understand the basis of a legitimate society, we can better evaluate where things 
                                                        
78 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1947), 5. 
 
  99 
have gone wrong and can seek remedies. We can identify irrational frustrations 
from legitimate concerns that we may have vis-à-vis the laws that govern our 
society. More importantly, it determines our place, as a people, within our existing 
legal system. Making that distinction is not very difficult, given one is equipped with 
a basic level of legal literacy; something that I’ll argue could be implemented within 
our society through creating a culture that’s more aware and interested in legal 
issues.  
4.2 The Basis of a Legitimate Society  
 So, let’s consider the basis of legitimate societies. Nature taught men that 
individual survival would not be possible, so we had to form societies. Rousseau 
rightly points out that the original coming together of people was based on need; we 
did not originally join others for sentimental reasons. Therefore, he claims that any 
binds that were formed or maintained beyond what was required to satisfy our 
basic needs and those of our offspring were out of convention. Thus, Rousseau 
draws an analogy between family and the human society:  
“The most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural, is the 
family: and even so the children remain attached to the father only so long as they 
need him for their preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is 
dissolved. The children, released from the obedience they owed to the father, and 
the father, released from the care he owed his children, return equally to 
independence. If they remain united, they continue so no longer naturally, but 
voluntarily; and the family itself is then maintained only by convention.”79  
 
The notions of ‘independence’ and ‘convention’, as Rousseau refers to them 
in this passage, require further consideration, as they are the pillars of all human 
                                                        
79 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1947), 6. 
 
  100 
societies. Convention generally refers to the usual and acceptable way in which 
things are done; but it also implies an agreement between the parties involved: i.e., 
those affected by the convention. The Oxford English Dictionary partly defines 
convention (in law) as: “A body constituted by statute to represent the people in 
their primary relations, and in some sense outside of the constitution, as e.g. for the 
framing or amending of the institution itself.”80 This definition implies a potential 
active role for the people in deciding the form and nature of conventions that bind 
them together as it leaves room for issues “outside of the constitution.” Likewise, if 
primitive men came together and formed a society and subsequently remained as a 
society, it was through an agreement, however implicit. Similarly, we’ve agreed, by 
convention, that those qualified for each task will take care of that task because that 
arrangement works to the advantage of everyone. That much is obvious, but what is 
less often talked about is the following: by forming conventions we have not and do 
not give up our rights but simply defer some of them to those who are more qualified 
than us. There is a crucial distinction to be made between giving up a right and 
deferring that right. Giving up a right usually comes about as a result of some bad 
action or negligence: convicted criminals have, through their actions, given up some 
basic rights that they would otherwise enjoy. Deferring a right, by contrast, is giving 
someone else or another institution the permission to make decisions on our behalf 
and handle certain situations for us. What that distinction translates into in 
everyday life is the following: we each reserve the right to object to, and oversee the 
execution of, the rights that we have deferred; thus, the whole idea of helplessness 
                                                        
80 Oxford English Dictionary, “Convention,” accessed February 10th, 2012,  
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/view/Entry/40714?redirectedFrom=Convention  
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with regards to laws becomes null. There are of course practical difficulties that give 
rise to the feeling of feebleness that overcomes us each time we find ourselves facing 
a legal dilemma, the dilemma being that attempting to stand up for our rights may 
end up costing and hurting us more on a personal level than remaining mute and 
suffering the consequences of others’ unfair actions. However, there is a very 
important difference between feeling intimidated and actually being helpless. And 
that’s what we need to remember as a people when it comes to legal matters. In fact, 
by deferring rights we are allowing others to make important decisions for us and 
it’s only fair that we, as citizens of a lawful society, know the content of the decisions 
that have been set out to ensure the protection of the very rights that we have 
deferred. In other words, since we give up some of what may be called our ‘natural 
rights’, such as the right to defend ourselves and acquire property by all means 
possible, we have the right to know and oversee the rules and regulations that have 
been put in place to replace those natural rights. Thus, two points are worth 
emphasizing: first, we defer some rights, we do not give them up; second, the 
deference of rights creates a new right for us - to know and participate in the 
decisions that are being made on our behalf.  
 To realize these points, we need to consider the notion of convention in 
conjunction with that of independence. As Rousseau points out, as soon as 
independence is achieved, the only remaining thing that keeps people together is 
convention; however, independence in many ways weakens the influence of 
conventions for certain parts of the population by bringing them power and more 
freedom as a consequence. In today’s society, this freedom translates into, amongst 
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other things, having more options than some other portions of the population. Often, 
it also means being a part of the group or process that makes decisions that greatly 
affect other parts of the population. The question is: “how does independence affect 
the basic conventions (or, in other words, the social contract) that bind us 
together?” The social contract remains satisfactory as long as the decisions made by 
those enjoying power, be it political or economic, respect the basic rights and 
freedoms of others. But, as we’ve learned, power and independence create a threat 
to the balance of the social contract and the power of conventions: that creates 
upsetting consequences for a portion of the population. That’s when frustration - 
accompanied by feelings of helplessness - sets in amongst many of those affected by 
the power of the independent in society. It is my belief that how we feel towards 
legal issues is a reflection of how we perceive the balance between independence 
and convention: if people feel helpless against social policies, it is partly because 
they tend to underestimate the power and weight that basic conventions carry while 
overestimating the power that lies within the independence of any given individual 
or group in society.   
 It’s important to remember that independence and convention are 
interdependent, when it comes to the foundations of any society. Therefore, being 
optimistic or pessimistic towards legal issues is in some sense like looking at 
different sides of the same coin: the interdependence of convention and 
independence could be as much a blessing as a sad fact for the general population, 
depending on how they perceive and deal with this interdependence and its 
consequences. Convention is what gave rise to societies and unequal independence 
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came as a consequence. However, convention is what turns the wheels of our 
society; and, if there is any power for the general population who lack some 
independence which others enjoy, it lies within the definition and reinforcement of 
the conventions that underlie the very basis of each society. And it is our job, as a 
people, to ensure that those conventions are defined and reinforced properly. 
Montesquieu once wisely said: “The corruption of every government generally 
begins with that of its principles.”81 The underlying principles of each society are 
manifested in its conventions. Thus, through their compliance (or disagreement) the 
people play a crucial role in shaping and reinforcing these principles, and ultimately 
the conventions that make everything else possible. An important way in which 
these principles are formed and maintained is through our laws. Thus, we can see 
that by remaining passive towards laws that affect us and those around us, by giving 
in to feelings of intimidation we are in fact approving the very laws and policies that 
have ignited genuine concerns within us. Worse yet, we are setting bad conventions 
for our society and the generations to come.   
Therefore, it’s worth our while to return to the original and basic principles 
that form the foundation of legitimate societies. By understanding them as they 
apply to today’s society, we can recognize deviations from them. That is an 
important step in becoming active citizens of a legal state, and in having a voice in 
the protection of our rights. By contrast, lack of reflection on such principles would 
make the population ignorant and insensitive to such matters. That, in turn, only 
                                                        
81 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Hafner Publishing 
Company, 1949), 109.  
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bestows more power upon the already powerful in each society to run matters as it 
suits them best; in those cases, we are no longer deferring certain basic rights but 
willingly giving them up. In the next section, we’ll consider some of these basic 
principles as they apply to our times.   
  This is all quite abstract. But these general truths form the bigger picture 
that we, as a society, have lost sight of (to a certain extent), which has been partly a 
consequence of our modern lifestyle and values.82 Many people (especially younger 
people) – such as my colleagues who refused to join my lawsuit even though I was 
offering to do all the work that was necessary - have an individualistic take on legal 
issues. Standing up for their rights is not a matter of being afraid for their life – 
which is a concern in some other countries in the world - but it is a matter of 
economical cost-benefit analysis. And that is an unsettling attitude towards legal 
matters because it results in giving up basic principles for the sake of short-term 
economic protection. For instance, many of my colleagues told me that “it wouldn’t 
be worth the trouble to go against this company,” or that “they didn’t want to spend 
any more money on the issue.” We will return to the fatal flaws that this kind of 
reasoning engenders when I consider the objections that could be raised against my 
view. For now, suffice to say that it is precisely because of, and perhaps despite, our 
individualistic approach as a society to legal matters that we ought to return to the 
basic principles, their meaning and implications in our modern society.  
                                                        
82 The last Canadian Federal Elections saw the lowest young voters’ turnout in the history of Canada. 
Elections Canada has expressed great concern about the continuing decline in voters’ turnout. Seeing 
little in politics that relates to the youth has been quoted as one of the reasons why the young people 
are failing to show up at the polls. See: Elections Canada, “Get Informed,” Elections Canada, August 16, 
2011, http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=yth/bas&document=index&lang=e. 
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4.3 Rousseau, The General Will, & Social Engagement 
Rousseau explains that, in coming together and forming societies, “each 
person gives himself to all, and not so to any one individual.”83 Thus: “Each of us 
places in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the 
general will; and as one body we all receive each member as an indivisible part of 
the whole.”84 He explains that, despite our individual differences, it’s what’s 
common in our different interests that forms the social bond that keeps society 
together: that is what forms and moves what Rousseau calls the general will. As he 
points out, in any legitimate society, the general will is impartial. But individual wills 
are partial; and that’s why “it is of utmost importance for obtaining the expression 
of the general will, that no partial society should be formed in the State, and that 
every citizen should speak his opinion entirely from himself.”85 It is therefore partial 
associations – which are distinct from personal interests that concern protection of 
basic rights, which in a general sense are the same for all people - that risk to taint 
the general will. So, two points are worth emphasizing: first, today’s society is 
arguably an aggregation of partial associations; and second, to keep the general will 
good we, citizens of our state, have the responsibility to keep partial societies in 
check. Conversely, I believe that it is through a focus on the general will – and its 
basic principles - that we are able to defend and correct different expressions of our 
rights. Without the participation of people, partial interests will enter the general 
will, mostly due to lack of resistance, and that’s how unfairness and corruption find 
                                                        
83 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1947), 15. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1947), 27. 
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their way through a legal and democratic state. To enable that kind of participation, 
we need to consider how different principles apply to our society and daily 
encounters with individuals and legal institutions.  
The evolution and different applications of two basic principles - that of 
equality and privacy - provide us with two examples that demonstrate the 
importance of people’s awareness, and their participation in keeping the general 
will good. In the previous chapter, we discussed the notion of rights as reasons and 
we concluded that rights were, in essence, valid reasons. The same kind of reasoning 
is applicable to the application of conventions or principles that underlie the general 
will. For instance, the notion of equality between genders has evolved through a 
constant redefinition, and valid reasoning, that have been offered and fought for 
throughout the past decades. Similarly, the definition of privacy and our right to it 
has evolved through social and technological changes which our society has 
undergone in the recent years. The preservation of these values requires the active 
involvement of people in their definition and enforcement.   
Article fifteen of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982, declares the following 
regarding equality: “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.”86 How this law applies to 
different situations is changing, and dependent on the situation we find ourselves in. 
                                                        
86 Department of Justice Canada, “Constitution Act 1982, Part 1, Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms” Department of Justice Canada, January 9th, 2012, http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-
11.html#sc:7.   
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For instance, the granting of equal rights to women, on many levels, has been a 
gradual and ongoing process. The entrance of women into the work force required 
new considerations of what it meant to be men’s equals, and that discussion was 
different than, although related to, their equality at home. The point to note is that 
different expressions of equality for women had to be realized and discussed 
throughout the years: for example their equality as wives, workers and political 
agents.  
 Another set of laws that derive their value from basic principles that shape 
our society is that of privacy. The Constitution Act of 1982 did not make any explicit 
references to privacy; however, its eighth article did declare the following: 
“Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”87 
Throughout the years, the issue of privacy has been explicitly addressed and 
decided on in legal settings, to the point that the courts now recognize a reasonable 
personal expectation of privacy – and they cite this article. Clearly, the fast changing 
rate of technological advances and modes of communication have greatly affected 
access to our personal information. The extent to which privacy remains valuable 
and respected is largely dependent on how - as citizens of a democratic system - we 
deal with instances of issues that arise regarding privacy laws. Without the 
participation of the general population, such issues may go unnoticed. If, as an 
employee of a company, an individual comes across a misuse, or indecent use, of 
their personal information, the right thing to do is to address that issue in an official 
                                                        
87 Department of Justice Canada, “Constitution Act 1982, Part 1, Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms” Department of Justice Canada, January 9th, 2012, 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-11.html#sc:7. 
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manner. Similarly, the open access to information has created concerns and 
challenges regarding our education system: how much access, and in what form, 
should be allowed in our schools? Or alternatively, how are we to go about 
educating new generations in light of the changes that our society has witnessed in 
the recent years? For instance, one related discussion has been about ways in which 
the relation between the “virtual” and “real” world is to be handled and discussed in 
schools: while some are against free and unlimited use of virtual sources within our 
education system, others insist that such sources offer valuable opportunities for 
better education.88 These are topics that need to be considered in light of our basic 
rights and the basic principles of our society, if we wish to preserve the values that 
keep the general will good.  
 These are only a few examples of changing domains in which the basic 
principles of our society, and our rights as persons, apply. There are institutions 
already in place that deal with individuals’ related concerns such as: the Better 
Business Bureau, The Medical Board; and The Education Board. However, for these 
institutions to fulfill their potential in preserving or reshaping basic principles 
according to the general will, people need to be making use of these resources and 
that requires a proactive attitude and a recognition of related issues as they come 
up. The best way to encourage and inform people about how they can become a part 
of the process that keeps our basic principles in check – and the general will good - 
is through education. The next section draws an analogy between the legal and the 
                                                        
88 BC Campus, “Privacy and Cloud-Based Educational Technology Conference Final Report”, BC 
Campus, April 13, 2011, http://fippa.bccampus.ca/.  
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medical system in Canada: some recent changes in the latter have greatly 
transformed people’s approach and attitude towards the medical field. I propose 
that a similar change in our legal education as it concerns the general public would 
bring about invaluable benefits for our society, just as increased awareness and 
education on health issues have led to better patient care and more effective 
medical care within our healthcare system.  
4.4 Change Through Legal Literacy   
The term patient-centered care (PCC) refers to a relatively new approach in 
the medical field regarding treatment.89 This approach departs from the more 
traditional and paternalistic approaches to patient care: whereas before, the doctor 
or health-care professional were the only agents deciding on modes of treatment for 
patients, PCC involves the patient in the process of choosing their treatment through 
open communication and discussions.90 In PCC, the patient is at the centre of 
decision-making and treatment is tailored to what suits the patient best: i.e., what 
best suits the patient’s specific needs and lifestyle. Dr. Donald Berwick points out 
three maxims which are fundamental to PCC: “(1)‘The needs of the patient come 
first;’(2)’Nothing about me without me;’(3)‘Every patient is the only patient.’”91 The 
first maxim refers to focusing attention to what the patient needs while considering 
what the patient wants. The second maxim aims to advocate transparency regarding 
                                                        
89 Special thanks to pharmacist Sara Azad for providing valuable input on this method.  
90 Pioneers of this approach include, amongst others, Debra Roter, John Ware, Michael Barry, Jack 
Fowler and others. See Donald M. Berwick, “What ‘Patient-Centered’ Should Mean: Confessions of an 
Extremist,” Health Affairs 28, no. 4, (2009), 559.  
91 Donald M. Berwick, “What ‘Patient-Centered’ Should Mean: Confessions of an Extremist,” Health 
Affairs 28, no. 4, (2009): 560.  
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modes of treatment and medication, and the participation of the patient in forming 
decisions about their treatment. The third maxim highlights the importance of 
customizing treatment to each patient’s needs. In light of these maxims, Dr. Berwick 
posits the following definition of PCC:  
“The experience (to the extent the informed, individual patient desires it) of 
transparency, individualization, recognition, respect, dignity, and choice in all 
matters, without exception, related to one’s person, circumstances, and 
relationships in health care.”92 
This approach has been, and is continuing to be, implemented through 
different venues - from doctors having the obligation to explain patients’ options of 
treatment to them, to educational programs on health and nutrition. There are two 
valuable advantages to this approach: first, it is a way of matching the patient’s 
specific needs while keeping in mind the patient’s history; and second – and more 
importantly for our purposes – this approach has created an interest and curiosity 
on the part of the patients and the population at large to inform themselves on 
various treatments and learn more about their health condition. Thanks to this 
approach, the medical system has become much more interactive in terms of 
communication between experts and ordinary people who are using the health care 
system. In fact, Dr. Berwick refers to this approach as a “dimension of quality in its 
own right.”93 That statement highlights not only more effective results that follow 
PCC, it also draws attention to its virtue as a process which gives rise to higher 
awareness. By increasing the patient’s involvement in treatment, health care 
professionals have succeeded in increasing the level of care and attention that 
                                                        
92 Ibid.  
93 Donald M. Berwick, “What ‘Patient-Centered’ Should Mean: Confessions of an Extremist,” Health 
Affairs 28, no. 4, (2009): 563. 
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patients, and to a great extent the general population, allot to issues of health: that’s 
partly because increased awareness has made people realize the importance of 
health-related topics in their lives. Educating patients has proven to be much more 
effective than just giving the patient a prescription of drugs and sending them home. 
In fact, a study done on the effects of PCC on medical outcomes found that: “Patient-
centered practice was associated with improved health status (less discomfort, less 
concern, and better mental health) and increased efficiency of care (fewer 
diagnostic tests and referrals).”94  
This change has come about through a collaboration of health organizations 
and health care professionals who have displayed a readiness and willingness to 
help patients and direct them towards the correct information. It marks a big change 
from some earlier practices in medicine where talking about subjects like the side 
effects of medication was almost considered taboo because the doctors worried 
about scaring the patient away from treatment. Nowadays, asking about the short 
and long-term effects of treatments has become a practiced right and general habit 
for most people.   
In fact, there has been a revolution in our cultural perspective on health and 
nutrition matters, in the last fifteen years. The coverage that the media allocates to 
these matters has largely increased in the past decade. Easy access to information, 
paired with people’s genuine concern for their health, has led them to seek 
                                                        
94 Moira Stewart, PhD, et al. “The Impact of Patient-Centered Care on Outcomes”, The Journal of 
Family Practice 49, no. 9 (2000), accessed January 13, 2012, 
http://www.jfponline.com/Pages.asp?AID=2601   
 
  112 
assistance from the professionals in separating the good information from the bad. 
Hence, what was once fear and uncertainty about different methods of treatment 
has now transformed into curiosity and an interest, on the part of the general public, 
in learning more. Popular bookstores are now filled with health-related books: a 
sure sign of the existing market for these subjects. In short, people are more 
interested than ever to learn about health and that, in turn, has established the right 
for them to know how they are being treated by the professionals in the field.  
It’s important to mention that one downside of this approach has been 
confusion amongst some people: with so much (often contradictory) information, it 
is hard to know what one should trust; and, undoubtedly, some pharmaceutical 
companies have benefited from the controversies surrounding certain treatments. 
Nevertheless, we must remember that the support of health professionals is present 
and accessible to a great majority of Canadians – just as this support is an integral 
part of PCC. Moreover, it is conceivable that the same level of confusion, if not more 
confusion, would have come about without PCC or other similar approaches, due to 
the rapid spread of information and pharmaceutical companies’ interest in selling 
their products using different marketing skills. In fact, the existence of PCC is a 
helpful resource in guiding and educating people about their options when it comes 
to matters concerning healthcare.  
I propose that it is very important to develop and promote an analogous 
system with regards to our laws and legal system. We often hear that seeking legal 
advice is expensive and that’s true to some extent. Yet, people don’t often enough 
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take advantage of legal aid services offered by the government or other institutions 
like our universities. Within many universities like McGill University, legal advice is 
offered to students by law students holding legal clinic hours. One major aim of legal 
aid clinics in universities is to guide students in their search for legal advice while 
also offering them some general information about their case. Similarly, in Quebec 
there are legal aid offices that are funded by the government and run by lawyers to 
offer legal advice to citizens. I used both of these resources in preparation for court. 
Both offices were rather empty when I visited them, a fact that I found quite 
surprising considering the large number of civil cases that are filed at the small 
claims court in Quebec each year. What we must do is add to, and promote, these 
kinds of services through different venues: mandatory courses in our secondary 
education, organizations that offer legal guidance to citizens (run by law students), 
and media coverage are just a few ways to realize this project. We must increase 
awareness about the law and legal resources that are available to people. The media 
is a great venue for educating people on such matters. Why not have legal experts 
commenting on legal news as often as doctors commenting on health news? This 
kind of openness about legal matters will then create an interest amongst people to 
seek out answers on their own. It is an unfortunate fact that basic legal matters are 
foreign concepts for most ordinary people. Meanwhile, big companies, or other 
powerful agents, capitalize on the ignorance of the general public in legal matters to 
make them believe what serves the company’s, or institution’s interests best.  
What we need is a basic legal literacy. We need to have courses that teach our 
children from a young age about such concepts as rights and law, and what those 
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mean in our society. The topic needs to be addressed explicitly, and not just in 
passing, in economic, business, and history classes. Basic legal education must 
become a mandatory part of our secondary curriculum. Such awareness would 
prevent many civil legal issues from arising in the first place, as people would make 
more informed decisions. That, in turn, would eliminate at least a portion of 
questionable policies designed by different agents and institutions, as legal literacy 
would keep many people from getting involved with such policies, which would 
then force legal agents to form better policies.  
 There is another reference to be made to the medical field and a shift in 
paradigm that has already been made there: evidence-based medicine is now being 
paired with the expert opinion approach to treatment. The latter involves using the 
education and expertise of doctors or other health care professionals to evaluate the 
merits of any treatment. Meanwhile, evidence-based medicine heavily relies on 
clinical trials and what has been learned from them. The two methods complement 
each other and lead to better patient-care. Similarly, the public must learn about 
different outcomes of legal proceedings in conjunction with the opinion of experts in 
legal matters. The role of professionals in the legal field is crucial as they have the 
expertise to interpret different legal outcomes. So for change to come about, we 
need willingness on the part of legal professionals to offer help, and perhaps 
incentives that would push these professionals to help implement a basic legal 
literacy amongst people. Moreover, the pairing of legal expertise with legal evidence 
reduces any kind of bias that may be present in each one of these sources 
considered alone. This method would familiarize people with how law is enforced 
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while providing additional incentive for law enforcement to pay extra attention to 
legal proceedings, as bad rulings and bad policies would upset a population largely 
literate in legal matters.   
 Of course a major concern that has been raised with regards to PCC concerns 
the shift in power from professionals to patients: a worry that’s also relevant in the 
legal reform being presented here. Is it really wise to give so much power to the 
patients when most of them lack the expertise and education of health care 
professionals? In other words, do patients know what’s best for them and will they 
really make the choice that’s in their best interest? What are the consequences of 
patients’ increased power in that sense? Many, including Dr. Berwick, have argued 
that it is not clear that this shift in power will indeed lead to undesirable results for 
the patients, or society at large. A major concern has been that patients’ increased 
influence could lead to misuse of the medical system, the worry being: “do you grant 
every demand for a CT scan, just because the patient demands it?”95 Others have 
argued that not including patients in the process of choosing their treatment is 
failing to fulfill the main objectives of medicine.96   
But the worry about this shift in power is much more serious for the legal 
field because, often, consequences of legal matters stretch beyond the life and needs 
of the individual who’s directly involved in the legal matter, for which they are 
seeking advice. By contrast, in the context of health-care, the patient is making a 
                                                        
95 Donald M. Berwick, “What ‘Patient-Centered’ Should Mean: Confessions of an Extremist,” Health 
Affairs 28, no. 4, (2009): 563.  
96 Christine Bechtel, Debra L. Ness, “If You Build it, Will They Come? Designing Truly Patient-Centered 
Health Care,” Health Affairs 29, no. 5, May 2010.    
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rather personal choice in choosing one mode of treatment over the other options. 
The consequences of medical decisions in that sense, rarely touch other members of 
society in lasting ways – barring, of course, the emotional strains that these 
decisions could have for those close to the patient. Therefore, it is my belief that in 
legal matters, the weight given to expert knowledge should be somewhat more 
dominating than is the case in PCC. In the health-care domain, the main job of 
professionals is to lay out the existing options along with their foreseeable 
consequences for the patients – in addition to their expert recommendation – 
whereas lawyers and other professionals in the legal field should, as many believe 
they do, have a responsibility towards the population at large to encourage and 
sustain justice. While many legal decisions are analogous to the choice of a dying 
patient who has to decide between a risky surgery or a guaranteed but limited time 
with their family, other legal choices affect other families, employees, our 
environment, or social well-being in general. There are many ways to balance the 
power that this legal approach gives to different individuals and institutions, 
without taking away the freedom of choice from these entities. For instance, legal 
choices that could be costly to a portion of the population should be accompanied by 
a notice that warns against the consequences of becoming involved with those 
choices: we are well aware of the function of the ‘fine print’ that is used in 
pharmaceutical advertising. Alternatively, legal institutions or lawyers should have 
an obligation to report questionable, albeit legal, decisions by big companies or 
other powerful agents to the government. An accumulation of such reports should 
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have consequences for the party that made deceitful legal choices, while making the 
general population aware of these choices through public awareness.  
For this reform to come about, we need to take a different approach towards 
training our lawyers and other professionals in the legal field: while skills in logical 
thinking are a requirement for working in the legal system, training emotions and 
personal values are just as important. Our professionals in the legal field need to 
look beyond mere facts and regulations to help build a more fair and efficient legal 
system. Robin Wellford Slocum, a professor of law at Chapman University, agrees: 
“The dominant presumption within legal education, that we can teach 
students to “think like lawyers” with a nearly singular focus on training the 
analytical mind, is a fiction based on a 19th Century understanding of the human 
brain that is inherently flawed. Modern neuroscience reveals that the ideal of a 
dispassionate analytical mind untainted by emotions and personal biases is a fallacy. 
Nonetheless, this fallacy has spawned an equally faulty premise that still dominates 
legal education today - that we can train students to be effective lawyers by virtually 
ignoring students’ emotions and by marginalizing the development of the emotional 
competencies. These presumptions impose a significant cost on our students and on 
the legal profession. By marginalizing the importance of emotional competence, we 
ill-prepare our students to work effectively with the complex interpersonal legal 
problems they will encounter in the practice of law.”97 
Therefore, the legal reform that is being suggested would require change in 
the way of educating the general public as well as professionals in the legal field. 
Undoubtedly, the implementation of this legal reform would generate 
questions for people, as different manifestations of laws could create some 
confusion at first: however, this confusion would be beneficial in the long run as it 
                                                        
97 Robin W. Slocum, “An Inconvenient Truth: The Need to Educate Emotionally Competent Lawyers,” 
Social Science Research Network, Last updated December 1st, 2011, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1889756## 
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would create curiosity and interest amongst people to learn more about the legal 
system.  
Legal literacy involves a theoretical and practical side. The theoretical part 
involves, amongst other things, a basic knowledge of, and reflection on, our 
principles and how they’re embodied in law. The practical side involves knowing the 
basic structure of our political and legal system: i.e., how the laws are decided, what 
resources are available for the general population, and how we, as citizens of a free 
society, influence the formation and reinforcement of rules and regulations. It is 
through an understanding of the theoretical side of legal matters as they apply to 
our times that we can bring about changes in practical matters.   
 
4.5 Some Objections: Social and Personal Considerations  
 I’d like to close this chapter by considering some objections that may be 
raised to the points discussed herein, and more generally to the point that I’ve been 
advocating all along: that to improve our legal system, we need to increase the 
knowledge and participation of people in our legal system. Important objections 
could be raised against these points on two levels: social and personal.  
In my opinion, the first and most preoccupying challenge that some may 
raise against my view is the following: the reason why many people are passive vis-
à-vis legal issues when they could, in theory, opt for legal action is a result of a risk-
benefit analysis; that is to say, most people - in calculating the personal benefits that 
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they could reap from procedures such as a lawsuit - realize that the costs are 
generally heavier, and the potential benefits are not worth those costs.98 It’s 
undeniable that this is, in fact, what happens in many cases. Some even claim that 
it’s unrealistic to expect most people to have the zeal and determination that 
procedures such as a lawsuit require. In response, I would bring up two points: that 
the kind of calculating mentality that is portrayed by this kind of reasoning is 
problematic and flawed; second, increased legal literacy would allow people to 
recognize their real chances of success and that, in turn, would modify their cost-
benefit analysis, which would then allow them to see that remaining silent in the 
face of injustice may be in fact the more costly option.  
 In such contexts, what may be considered personal benefit is, in fact, 
personal cost in the long run: we realize this when we consider the bigger picture 
and how our legal issues fit in that picture. Consider the injustice that is being done 
to thousands of Canadian teens who are offered or pressured into taking drugs. The 
adverse long term effects of drug use is an undeniable fact that’s been confirmed by 
hundreds of studies.99 Amongst other factors, parents’ involvement in enforcing 
anti-drug laws is crucial. For instance, it is parents’ responsibility to ensure that 
their kids’ school includes education on drugs. Many parents mistakenly believe that 
                                                        
98 Costs, in this context, include: time and money as well as psychological and emotional involvement.  
99 For two examples of such studies, please see: Martinez L. Contreras et al., “Drug abuse in 
adolescent offenders: analysis of psychosocial variables involved,” Pubmed.gov. accessed March 23rd, 
2012, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22508015 and also Louisa Degenhardt et al. “Extent of 
illicit drug use and dependence, and their contribution to the global burden of disease.” The Lancet, 
379, no. 98010 (2012): 55-70. 
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their kids are somehow immune to this issue and other pervasive problems that 
grip thousands of Canadian teens year after year. Consequently, they fail to become 
involved on a familial and social level in helping fight the war against drugs. Thus, 
even though they save themselves the trouble of going to meetings or working with 
other parents to help solve the issue of drug abuse in teens, in the long run they are 
doing themselves and their children a disservice. That is because even if their own 
kid escapes the nightmare of drug addiction, they may lose a dear friend to that 
cause. Worse yet, passive parents are contributing to a society filled with 
corruption, and even if they won’t be around to live in that society; that will be the 
world that their kids and grandchildren will have to live in.  
Therefore, short-term calculative thinking, while necessary in some cases 
(e.g. pursuing a debtor for a small amount of money may not be worth the trouble of 
filing a lawsuit, especially if one has more important social and familial 
responsibilities to attend to), is poisonous for a healthy general will. It is our actions 
and reactions to the law that determine the general will. These actions and reactions 
include what we do or fail to do in reinforcing of laws such as the one discussed 
above. So, clearly, if most of us are only thinking of our personal short-term benefit, 
we cannot have a healthy general will. We must remember that the general will sets 
the boundaries of what can and cannot be counted as acceptable in each society: so 
each society is only as good as the thinking and the actions of its individuals. This is 
why it’s important for us as a people to look beyond what is most convenient for us 
in each case and actually consider the consequences which our decisions and 
actions bring about in such circumstances. 
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 This brings me to the second point regarding the cost/benefit analysis that 
supposedly leads people to refrain from becoming involved in legal issues or react 
to bad law in different contexts. I believe that a correct medium - to long-term cost-
benefit analysis reveals that taking steps towards improving our system involves 
more benefits than costs for everyone because, even if legal procedures don’t 
achieve our ultimate goal (like winning a lawsuit), they will set an example and a 
record of the issue that was worrying us. An accumulation of this kind of action 
would push the legal system to consider the issue. For instance, many complaints 
against one company would be much more effective, in legal terms, than one 
complaint from one unhappy individual. Moreover, another benefit of acting as a 
group is that it would cost each individual much less in time, money, and troubles to 
voice their view and problems. Thus, in many cases there are really more potential 
benefits in taking action than in remaining silent.  
Others would still argue that it is simply not feasible or realistic to expect a 
majority of the population to be active in their dealings with the law. Time and 
resources present huge impediments to assuming an active role in our legal state, 
even when there is a willingness to act. This is indeed a legitimate and real concern, 
but one for which there are certainly solutions. In response, I would say that a 
greater focus on facilitating activism is part of our social responsibility. We need to 
advertise and implement more systems through which ordinary people, be they rich 
or poor, could express their concerns without having to go through the whole legal 
process of making a complaint. One way to do this is having organizations that are 
specifically designed to receive such complaints and to have experts who evaluate 
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these complaints and pass on legitimate concerns to higher governmental 
organizations. This kind of change can even start at a private level: individual 
professional practices could join and offer such services. Their success would be 
evidence for the benefits that this kind of structural change could bring about.  
The second major objection to this view is met at a social level. Some may 
rightly object to this reform by pointing out the many meticulous changes that it 
requires at different levels of education and our institutions while also noting the 
many, ironically, legal approvals that would have to precede it. In response, I would 
remind them that this reform could, and should realistically, come about according 
to a bottom-up scheme: that is to say, small changes in small communities should 
lead to big changes at higher levels of our society. Expecting this kind of change to 
start at the governmental level is simply unrealistic. One of the big advantages of 
living in a country like Canada is that information could be accessed fairly easily, 
which means that change through education need not be very costly at all: teachers’ 
willingness alone to educate their students on this topic would go a long way.  
Moreover, the foundation of this legal reform is made up of social and 
cultural awareness: and that’s something that our population could achieve if we 
succeed in creating an interest for it. Furthermore, from an economical point of 
view, it would be in lawyers’ interest to applaud a legally aware population since 
that kind of culture would increase their clientele, as people’s increased interest 
would encourage them to consult lawyers as they discovered the possibilities that a 
legal democractic system has to offer them. It would be in every sense a win-win 
 
  123 
situation as our legal resources would be better spent on more inevitable cases and 
as legal corruption would decrease.  
Active involvement from the people would thus take care of concerns that 
may be raised against this view, on individual and social levels.    
4.6 How to Operationalize This Proposal100 
  The most attractive aspect of my proposal is that once the appropriate 
authorities accept its implementation, it would take a very small portion of our 
resources to implement. Here are the bullet point of some the way in which I believe 
this proposal can be integrated  within our secondary curriculum: 
 Seminars 
 Replacing one of the two computer classes  
 In Quebec, the material could be covered in what is called ‘moral’ classes 
 Each course (history, economics, etc) could dedicate a few hours to 
discussing legal issues, specifically and explicitly 
Let us begin with the first suggestion regarding seminars. Our high schools can 
invite speakers who are knowledgeable on the topic to talk to the students about 
legal issues. The speakers would have to have communication, teaching and 
speaking skills – which are often characteristics of Professors and to some extent 
lawyers. These skills are required so that the speaker can manage the material in a 
                                                        
100 Many thanks to Dr. Shannon Dea and Dr. Mathieu Doucet for stressing the importance of 
providing further details for this proposal. Their comments have been truly helpful in forming the 
suggestions that follow in this section.  
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way that can be appealing and interesting to teenagers. Attending such seminars 
would be mandatory for students – adding only a couple of hours to the school day 
once every month or once every two months. The students would have to write 
some kind of opinion or summary piece about these seminars. With this option, 
expenditure would be minimal as only two hours would have to be added each 
month, and the other part of the expense would consist of paying the speaker to 
present and paying the staff who would have to stay in order to keep students in 
school for these seminars. Moreover, the cost of paying the speaker could be zero, as 
many eager law students may be interested in rendering that service without 
charge. It’s something that could look good on one’s resumé while it would not even 
take a lot of hours to prepare for.   
 Another option would be to incorporate some courses together to make 
room for legal studies. For instance, Canadian history and Canadian geography could 
be incoporated into one course to make space for legal studies. Alternatively, the 
time allotted to health and physical education could be combined with arts 
education to free some time for legal studies.101 Bottom line is that our current 
curriculum could be changed to make the incorporation of legal studies a possibility 
in terms of time. In terms of other resources, this option would require hiring new 
teachers for legal studies. These teachers would not necessarily have to be an expert 
on the topic: remember that the extent of legal literacy that I am suggesting doesn’t 
exceed what has been presented in this thesis. Therefore, many candidates would be 
                                                        
101 For a list of required  courses in high school, please see “What do I need to graduate?” Ontario 
Ministry of Education, accessed March 20th, 2012, 
http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/students/curriculum.html. 
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suitable for this position : those holding PhD’s in philosophy of law, retired or 
retiring lawyers, law students. Alternatively, high school teachers could undergo a 
short training on the topic to teach this class.  
 Similarly, in Quebec there is a course in high school called Morals : the aim of 
this class is mostly to teach etiquette to the students and discuss social mannerism 
(previously some religious studies were also incorporated in this class until 
objections of parents forced the school board to eject religious studies from the 
secondary curriculum).102 I see this class a fitting place to talk about legal issues. 
Learning about legal matters does not have to completely replace that material 
which is taught in the Moral classes, but it could definitely become part of the 
material covered in that class.  
Again, I must emphasize the importance of teaching this topic in an explicit 
manner – and not just in conjunction with some economic theory that is being 
taught alongside the legal issue, which often ends up being mentioned in a format of 
a footnote. This option, like the previous one would only require a short training and 
overview of the general points to be presented : which is not somethign that would 
exceed the capabilities of any good high school teachers.  
Another alternative, would be for each class to dedicate a few hours to 
covering legal issues, perhaps even in relation to, even if separate from, that class. 
For instance, the history class could dedicate a few hours each month to discussing 
these issues or having a speaker come in to talk about legal issues. If each class 
                                                        
102 Please see “Secondary Education,” Education, Loisir et Sport Québec, accessed March 20th, 2012, 
http://www.mels.gouv.qc.ca/gr-pub/menu-curricu-a.htm#second.  
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succeeded in making that time allotment, I believe that the level of legal éducation 
which I’m aiming for could be achieved.   
 The bigger hurdle on the way of realizing this project is – as you may have 
guest – its first step, i.e. getting government officials and the appropriate 
governmental bodies to approve this project. Studies would have to be done to 
persuade the people in charge that this vision would be beneficial for our youth, as 
well as our society at large. Overcoming that obstacle would require action from 
parents, teachers and other citizens to ask for such a change. I grant that getting this 
proposal to pass through our governmental bodies is perhaps the most difficult and 
consuming part of the project. However, once in motion the benefits of having more 
educated and aware young adults would surely outweigh the comparatively 
minimal cost that it would place on our budget.  
 I must note that the suggestions that I’ve presented here are not a complete 
nor exhaustive list of all the ways in which this change could or should come about. 
These are just some – what I consider to be promising – starting points.  
At this point, it is worth returning to a concern that some may have regarding 
the tension that may be seen between the difficulty of teaching people about legal 
issues – especially in light of the complex role that interpretation plays in law, as 
seen in the second chapter.  The question may be: “how could be expect to 
successfully teach such a complex topic to students who are so young and 
inexperienced?” 
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 We must remember that secondary schools are mandated to help form well-
rounded young adults. I consider a basic legal education a necessary part of that 
formation for reasons that have been discussed throughout this thesis. Moreover, I 
would point out that economics, mathematics and other sciences are still being 
taught in our high schools, even though they are also complex subjects that are 
difficult to perfect. Yet, we teach them in high school because the general culture 
that the teaching of these subjects leaves for the students is one that can be applied 
in day to day life. For instance, a basic knowledge of how the taxes and interest rates 
work and the ability to read and understand those concepts in daily news is 
essential for young adults entering college, university or the job market.  
 The same kind of general knowledge is necessary in the field of law, as 
corporations and other entities target our youth in different ways: be it through 
internships, job contracts or different campaigns that try to influence young people 
for what is usually private benefits. In fact, legal literacy is crucial for young people 
graduating from high school, as they become young adults who are part of a 
changing society. The end of high school, as far as the law is concerned, marks the 
start of adulthood. As we know, being an adult has many connotations in today’s 
world, in the present context, the most important being that post-high school, 
individuals are held responsible for their actions. Thus, the depth of the change in 
environment and social responsibility that takes place once students graduate from 
high school cannot be overstated: whereas in high school, students are still part a 
semi-artificial environment, the real world where companies chase eighteen year- 
olds to give them credit cards is one in which teenagers are treated as adults. It 
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seems only fair that we equip our youth with the basic knowledge that will help 
them navigate the adult world, without harming themselves significantly. 
Overseeing a legal education would have negative and sometimes lasting effects on 
our youth and by extension on our society, as a whole.  
 Moreover, the judiciary system is a branch of our government whose 
influence is tremendous on our social and political system. We saw how this is the 
case in chapter three where we considered some basic structures of our political 
society. As we discussed, the actions of the people within the judiciary system play a 
major role in keeping our government in check by adding precision to what may 
otherwise be very general laws. In that sense, the political and judiciary system 
check and balance one another. Since the legal system is major branch of our 
government and our political system and if we recognize the importance of teaching 
our youth about our political system, it seems – at best – arbitrary that we would 
leave out an education about the basics of our legal system.  
 In sum, my theory does not expect citizens to understand the details of 
complicated legal theories but I do believe it’s both reasonable and advantageous to 
expect a basic level of legal literacy amongst our citizens. Think of the general 
awareness about the use of drugs in the medical field: most people today recognize 
that they ought not to mix different drugs together, and that encourages anyone 
who cares about their own health to seek advice on such matters. Thus, while 
people know that they ought not to mix medications, most don’t know what the 
exact consequences of mixing medication X with medication Y would be. I believe a 
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similar change is needed in our legal system: we need as much literacy as will help 
most people recognize what could be dangerous to their basic interests and 
fundamental rights.103  
For these reasons, I maintain that it is unjustifiable, and in some sense, 
surprising that we do not already have legal education as part of our secondary 
curriculum. I will end this chapter by pointing out that while many benefits could be 
reaped from the implementation of such education, its disadvantages – besides the 
monetary cost which we would probably recover by having better adjusted citizens 
who make better decisions - are difficult to fathom. That is not to say that getting the 
program going does not require time and efforts of people who believe in this 
program: it is only to say that once implemented, we as a society stand to gain much 
from it.  
Further institutional changes could come through subsidized governmental 
programs that provide legal information for those who could not afford it otherwise. 
Of course, such system would require a mechanism to filter the demand for legal 
advice based on need: for instance, governmental help would go to those with lower 
income first and then to others who could afford seeking legal advice through other 
mediums that have been proposed in this chapter. Evidently, to implement such 
institutional changes some evidence regarding the efficacy of these programs would 
be needed. Therefore, one of the first steps in achieving this goal would perhaps be 
to conduct studies on the effectiveness of the changes proposed earlier in this 
                                                        
103 Special thanks to Dr. Shannon Dea and Dr. Mathieu Doucet for pointing out the tension that may 
be seen between the complexity of legal concepts – especially in light of what has been discussed in 
previous chapter – and my proposal to educate the population at large on such difficult matters.  
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chapter. This seems like a realistic goal as the previous suggestions – such as the 
cooperation of lawyers or the help of law students – would cost less in money while 
also providing an opportunity to conduct research that would hopefully help 
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Conclusion 
The main objective of this thesis has been to underline a source for legal 
improvement that has been long overlooked - the role of ordinary citizens. While it 
is common knowledge that great changes could come about through solidarity of the 
people, we often forget about the small daily changes that can transform our legal 
state in significant ways. I have aimed to show the ways in which ordinary people 
could contribute to the fairness and efficiency of their state, by demanding and 
taking part in such changes. 
 In my opinion, there are two main reasons why this topic has been 
overlooked, or dismissed, for so long : first, ordinary people generally lack the kind 
of knowledge and education that is required to play their part as truly active citizens 
in a legal democratic state, and second, there seems to be a prevalent cultural belief 
in our society that the more powerful are the ones who decide and control legal, as 
well as other related, matters. That belief has given rise to the misconception of 
ordinary people’s lack of real influence in such matters, leading many to view any 
efforts in that direction as futile. I have argued that that misconception stands to be 
corrected and one of the most promising ways of correcting it is through legal 
education.  
I maintain that, to be a truly active citizen of a legal state, one needs to have 
some considerable knowledge about its legal system and the possibilities that it 
offers its people. That’s why it is crucial to educate our citizens on the structure of 
law and the general ways in which our legal system operates. Without that kind of 
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knowledge, people are deprived of the chance to practice choices that are rightly 
theirs. As a way of achieving that knowledge, I’ve proposed, as one possible method, 
a basic overview of the basis, structure, content and purpose of law.  
Chapter two presented an overview of some major legal theories which set 
the foundations of a legal state, its boundaries and power. It was concluded that 
divine natural law theory has important flaws that prevent it from forming a 
suitable foundation for a fair legal state, partly because it obstructs basic human 
rights such as freedom of association. And our citizens need to be mindful of that. 
We also saw that rational natural law could possibly be a good model for a fair state, 
given that a way is found to consider and evaluate different forms of rationality. 
Hart’s conception of legal positivism pointed us towards an essential characteristic 
of law: its dependence on people’s acceptance of it. That realization led us through a 
discussion about the role of morality in law. It was concluded that morality does in 
fact have a central place in law: to the point that legal theories that dismiss the 
prevalent moral convictions of the people are doomed.  
The recognition of the place of morality in law raised the following question: 
how is morality incorporated in law? The multitude of moral convictions in each 
society poses a pragmatic difficulty for the evaluation and selection of the right 
ideals that should form the basis of our laws. Some answers were found in 
Dworkin’s theory of interpretation in law. His analysis of interpretation as a method 
consists of three steps: identifying the main elements of the topic, determining the 
purpose of the topic and applying changes that allow the main elements of the topic 
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to achieve its purpose. It was pointed out that without the input of the general 
public, this process of interpretation could not be completed; at least not in a proper 
manner, which then leads to what we consider to be bad laws. Chapter two ended 
with an important observation: that all three theories that were considered included 
some form of interpretation. It was noted that the realization of the omnipresent 
role of interpretation in different conceptions of legal theory presents an 
opportunity for people to aim for change and to understand legal issues in a better 
way.  
The third chapter focused on the purpose and content of law, as two other 
aspects of law that need to be well understood before people can fully participate in 
forming and changing their legal state. I claimed that it was crucial to understand 
how the content and purpose of law influence one another. Because it is through 
interpretation that people can keep their legal state in check and interpretation 
could not be carried out properly without a basic understanding of the main 
elements of our legal state:  namely, its content and purpose. For instance, it was 
pointed out how a relational understanding of rights differs from the view of rights 
simply as what people are owed. Understanding rights as ‘valid reasons’ that bestow 
responsibilities on all of us, regardless of our position in society, changes the 
dynamics of people’s reaction to law. This understanding translates into an 
obligation for the people to actively take part in shaping and reinforcement of social 
values, which are portrayed through our laws. Without their voice, what I called the 
‘balance of justice’ could not approach equilibrium, as the content of law could be 
misused by governments or other entities to achieve purposes which deviate from 
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the original objectives of law. Similarly, a lack of knowledge and understanding of 
other elements that make up the content of our laws can transform them into 
venues for different kinds of exploitation. This chapter thus underlined the 
importance of having a basic understanding of the content of law and its aim 
because the interaction between the two affects the lives of all citizens. Chapter 
three also showed some of the ways in which interpretation and active participation 
could bring about positive changes for the people and, more importantly, maintain 
social fairness through a fast changing world.  
Chapter four provided additional reasons for people’s active involvement in 
legal matters. It was shown that the very structure of any legitimate political society 
formed a strong reason for people’s involvement in it. The main argument was that, 
since by virtue of living in a political society, some of what used to be considered our 
‘natural rights’ are taken away from us – such as the right to protect ourselves by all 
means possible – and since we transfer some fundamental aspects of our basic 
rights to authority, it is crucial that we remain aware of how our lives are changed 
and affected by the decisions that are made on our behalf. Consideration of some 
basic facts of political philosophy revealed the following truths: society is kept 
together through convention: it is our interdependence on each other that keeps us 
together in the first place, then come sentimental reasons. Yet, living according to 
convention has also meant attributing different roles and levels of power to various 
parts of the population which, in turn, has created unequal degrees of independence 
for different people. I argued that the pull of convention is what makes up for what 
some portions of the population are missing in terms of independence. What that 
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means is that, contrary to popular belief, important decisions can be influenced by 
the desires of the general population, if they manage to take action, on large and 
small scales.  
Quite naturally, this view may be confronted with the objections of some 
people who may accuse it of being too idealistic. In response to them, I have 
proposed what I consider to be a first, and substantial, step towards achieving a 
legal state within which all people feel empowered; regardless of their financial 
standing. I maintain that it is quite possible to imagine how that kind of change 
could be brought about through a legal education. It’s easy to imagine because we 
can already see a very similar change within the medical field: a relatively new 
approach that has been labeled as ‘patient-centered care’ (PCC) has revolutionized 
people’s health as well as their approach towards their health.  
Whereas traditional approaches to treatment only involved the health care 
professional in making decisions, PCC gives an important role to the patient in 
deciding what kind of treatment would best suit their lifestyle and needs. The result 
has been an increased interest on the part of the patients to learn about different 
alternatives and what each involves. The open communication that’s been made 
possible thanks to PCC has not only improved patients’ health but it’s also provided 
valuable information for doctors and researchers that was less easily accessible 
before the implementation of this approach. I have proposed a similar reform for 
our legal system. The first step in achieving that reform should be to make 
mandatory a basic legal education for all: that education would come in the form of 
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courses that are taught in our secondary schools and colleges. The next step would 
be making legal advice more accessible to a greater number of people. I suggested 
the collaboration of private practices to offer that kind of advice at an affordable 
rate: this change would work in the advantage of these practices because people’s 
increased interest in legal matters would create a good market for such services as 
people would need help in sorting out different kinds of information. Other changes 
and programs supported by the government would help this process in the long run. 
In the meanwhile, the media would be an excellent source for providing and 
popularizing legal education for the population at large, much like we’ve seen 
happen with the media coverage of matters of human health.  
Together, these changes would make people aware of the differences that 
they could make in helping justice. The rather low costs of implementing this reform 
pale in comparison to the potential gain that we can achieve through it on social, 
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